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Abstract
We consider a model of decentralized bargaining among three parties. Parties
meet one-on-one after being randomly matched, and can sell or buy votes to one an-
other. The party with a majority of the votes can decide to implement its preferred
policy or extend negotiations to capture additional rents. We provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which a party acts as an
intermediary, transferring resources and voting rights among parties that wouldn’t
negotiate directly with one another. These conditions are generic, do not require
special frictions, and include ‘well-behaved’ (i.e., single-peaked) preference profiles.
∗We thank Juliana Bambaci, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Alessandra Casella, Alessandro Lizzeri, Adam
Meirowitz, Carlo Prato, Sebastian Saiegh and Francesco Squintani for comments and suggestions.
†Matias Iaryczower: Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, email: mi-
aryc@princeton.edu; Santiago Oliveros: Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London,
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, e-mail: Santiago.Oliveros@rhul.ac.uk
“From the time he became Majority Leader, Johnson began using talk on
the floor as a smoke screen for the maneuvering that was taking place in the
cloakrooms, . . . , as a method of stalling the Senate to give him time to work
out his deals.” Robert Caro in The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Master of the
Senate.
1 Introduction
Most significant public policy choices in modern democracies are decided in legislatures
and other collective bodies. From health care reform, to national defense or regulation
of economic activity, enacting new policies requires mutual understanding among legis-
lators with different political views. It also requires, more often than not, a variety of
compromises and political exchanges among these legislators.
A vast majority of these political exchanges takes the form of private negotiations among
legislators, which occur well before a bill is taken up for consideration. In fact, compro-
mises among members of a legislative coalition are rarely struck publicly and simultane-
ously at the time when a proposal is up for a vote, but instead are constructed through a
series of backroom deals carried out by power brokers, who act as middlemen in legislative
bargaining.
Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the dynamics of decentralized legislative bar-
gaining: on how private agreements among parties affect subsequent negotiations and
policy outcomes, and on how parties’ conjectures of future negotiations affect agreements
in the first place. In this context, our key consideration is to explain the emergence and
role of middlemen in legislative bargaining. Can some legislative actors enable deals by
putting together two parties that wouldn’t negotiate directly with one another? If yes,
under what conditions is this possible? What do these power brokers bring to the table?
Does this require a particular restriction on the frequency with which different parties
interact with one another, or unorthodox restrictions on their preferences?
To address these questions, we propose a model of decentralized multilateral bargaining
that captures the key dynamics of backroom deals in a parsimonious setting. There
are three parties, each of which is endowed with an initial vote share, and infinitely
many periods (i.e., no fixed deadline for negotiations). In each period before a policy is
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implemented, two parties meet one-on-one, according to a stochastic matching process,
and can offer to buy or sell their votes to one another in exchange of favors.1 As in Gul
(1989), parties selling their votes to others relinquish their voting rights, and are excluded
from further negotiations. If a party holds a majority of the votes after negotiations, it
can choose to implement its preferred policy or extend negotiations for another period.
Otherwise, the process of negotiations continues in the next period by default.
The main result of the paper is that a number of successful political deals occur because
of the endogenous emergence of a political broker : a party that serves as an intermedi-
ary between two parties that wouldn’t negotiate directly with one another, transferring
resources and voting rights among them in an indirect trade. Moreover, we show that in
order to be able to fulfill this role, the broker must have a stake in the policy outcome: a
party who only cares about rents cannot add value to what other parties can achieve in
direct negotiations. This result points to a fundamental difference between intermediaries
in politics and in exchange economies (Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Biglaiser (1993),
Condorelli and Galeotti (2011)).
Our approach to attack this problem is to pose it as one of rationalizability of a stationary
equilibrium with intermediation, or broker equilibrium. In particular, we ask whether
for given matching parameters (discount factor and matching probabilities), there exist
preference profiles for which we can support a broker equilibrium. A key advantage of this
formulation is that the equilibrium conditions can be written as a set of linear inequalities
Au ≤ α, where the unknowns are the payoffs ui(zj) of party i for implementing policy
zj, and A is a matrix of matching parameters. We can then use basic duality results
from convex analysis to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a
solution to this problem. We show, in fact, that the endogenous emergence of brokers
is a robust equilibrium phenomenon. The conditions under which broker equilibria exist
are generic and do not require special frictions: broker equilibria can be supported with
uniform matching and vanishing bargaining frictions.
The duality approach is especially productive in this setting to characterize properties
of the preference profiles that admit broker equilibria. This is because any constraint
on preference profiles can be expressed as a modified matrix of matching parameters A′.
1The exact nature of these favors depends on the application. See Baron and Diermeier (2001) for a
discussion of various examples in the context of legislatures, from jobs for party stalwarts to board seats
on public companies and transfers to interest groups.
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As a result, establishing conditions for the existence of a broker equilibrium under some
constraints on preferences boils down to finding conditions for the existence of a solution
to the modified system of inequalities.
We show, in particular, that broker equilibria can be supported with ‘well-behaved’ pref-
erence profiles (single-peaked, even quadratic or linear loss in a unidimensional space).
Thus, the existence of brokers doesn’t require cycles in the majority preference. It does,
however, require a minimal diversity in the space of alternatives. In fact, if the space
of policies is binary, as in Philipson and Snyder (1996) or Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and
Palfrey (2012), a broker equilibrium cannot exist.
Establishing the existence of a broker equilibrium could ultimately be uninteresting if
middlemen did not have an impact on outcomes and/or welfare. We show, however,
that this is not the case. To do this, we establish the existence of a broker equilibrium
for preference profiles under which the broker equilibrium implements a different policy
outcome than the one that would result in the absence of the broker, or in any equilibrium
maintaining the composition of the legislature. We then show that in this situation the
broker equilibrium is welfare improving, but not necessarily efficient, even as the time
between trading opportunities goes to zero.
While we develop our main results in the context of a majoritarian legislature, the logic
for the existence of brokers applies in a wider set of circumstances. In the paper we
discuss some of these extensions. First, we consider a committee acting under unanimity
rule, such as the Council of the European Union. A key distinction of this setting is that
inaction becomes a possible equilibrium outcome in negotiations between two parties.
We show, however, that with small modifications the analysis of brokers with unanimity
rule is similar to the majoritarian case, and that our existence result extends to this
environment.
Finally, we consider the possibility that an outside actor, such as the President or an
interest group, acts as a broker. In fact, once granted access to negotiations, an interest
group is strategically equivalent to internal members of the legislature, except for the
fact that it cannot sell votes in the initial round of decentralized bargaining. Our main
analysis therefore provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a broker equilibrium
in this case as well. The analysis applies directly to the case of a President without veto
power, and can easily be extended to allow for veto power building on the results for
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majoritarian and unanimous legislatures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the literature in Section 2, and
present the model in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze the final bargaining stage, in which
only two parties control voting rights, and begin our analysis of the trade-offs parties face
in decentralized bargaining. In Section 5 we present our main results. In Section 6 we
discuss various extensions: a majoritarian legislature with no majority party, unanimity
rule, and interest groups as lobbies. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The analysis of vote trading is fundamentally different from that of a typical exchange
economy (Riker and Brams (1973), Philipson and Snyder (1996)). While voting rights
per se have no impact on payoffs, they allow holders to have a say in the collective
outcome. Because individuals with different preferences are willing to make different
tradeoffs between policies, and between policies and favors, changes in the identity of
vote holders can have an effect on all participants. As a result, participants must make
conjectures about one another’s behavior in order to calculate their optimal vote buying
or vote trading strategies.
The prevailing approach to study decentralized buying and selling of votes in a committee
is to model exchanges as occurring in a competitive market for votes (Philipson and
Snyder (1996), Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012)). In these models, there are
two alternatives (a majority and a minority position) and committee members have the
opportunity to buy and sell votes at posted prices, which they take as given.2 In this
paper we depart from the price-taking tradition in order to capture the key dynamics of
backroom deals. We assume that parties meet one-on-one, according to a probabilistic
matching, and can offer to buy or sell their votes to one another at a price they negotiate.
Parties are fully strategic and forward looking about the implications of their trades on
2Because of the interdependencies in demand, and the discontinuity in payoffs associated with simple
majority rule, the standard equilibrium notion leads to nonexistence. To address this issue, Philipson and
Snyder (1996) consider a semi-centralized market for votes, in which a floor manager rations any excess
supply by randomly choosing suppliers among those willing to sell their vote at the posted price, while
distributing all revenues generated by vote selling evenly across all members of the majority side. Casella,
Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012) instead, allow for mixed (probabilistic) demands, and require only
that the market clears in expectation, while ex post clearing obtains through a rationing rule.
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subsequent negotiations and policy outcomes.
Our model of decentralized bargaining builds on Gul (1989), but has important differences
in scope and in the model itself. Gul shows that given a condition on payoffs that guar-
antees that value functions are superadditive, as bargaining frictions vanish (δ → 1) there
is a unique efficient equilibrium, and players’ equilibrium payoffs converge to the Shapley
value (under uniform matching). In our model, instead, parties interact in a majority
game, and obtain status quo payoffs until a party holding a majority of the votes decides
to enact a new policy. In this setup, Gul’s assumption on payoffs does not necessarily
hold, and therefore neither does the result on efficiency of equilibria as δ → 1.
Our paper complements several related strands of literature. First, our decentralized
bargaining approach contrasts with the centralized bargaining approach of Banks and
Duggan (2000) and Jackson and Moselle (2002), who build on the Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) framework of bargaining over distribution. Here a proposer makes an offer of policy
and transfers to all members of a policy coalition simultaneously. Because of this, these
papers cannot consider the phenomenon of intermediation in the legislative setting.
Second, in our model, vote trading is done internally, by members of the committee.
This complements the literature on vote buying of inside members by outsiders (Myerson
(1993), Dixit and Londregan (1996), Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Banks (2000), Dier-
meier and Myerson (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Dal Bo (2007), and Dekel, Jackson,
and Wolinsky (2008, 2009)). Importantly, in these models vote buyers are precluded from
forming coalitions among them, or from reselling their votes to members of the committee.
Third, as in models of vote markets, bargaining over policymaking, and vote buying, we
consider policy and transfers. This approach complements the literature on logrolling,
where two legislators exchange their support for a bill in exchange for support in another
bill (see Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Tullock (1970), Riker and Brams (1973), Bernholz
(1975), and Miller (1975, 1977); see also Hortala-Vallve (2011)).
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on intermediaries in exchange economies
(see for example Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Yanelle (1989), Biglaiser (1993)). The
closest paper is Condorelli and Galeotti (2011). In the model, a set of agents located on
a network trade a single private good, and the current owner of the good decides whether
to consume or resale. In this framework, the interest lies in the characterization of which
agents choose to resale, and in the payoffs they obtain. Condorelli and Galeotti show
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that the agents who resale in earlier periods obtain a payoff advantage over later dealers,
and provide examples in which the agents who choose to resale in equilibrium are the low
valuation traders who provide access to valuable areas of the network.3 Our paper differs
from these in various ways. Chief among these is that in our setup agents trade votes to
determine a collective decision. Thus, when reselling, agents in our model care not only
about extracting rents from individuals with high willingness to pay, but also about the
policy implications of the resulting distribution of votes.
3 The Model
There are 3 parties, i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3}, and an infinite number of periods, τ = 1, 2, . . ..
Each party i ∈ N has an ideal policy zi ∈ X, a discount factor δ, and is endowed with
ki > 0 votes. Parties participate in a process of bilateral transactions to enact a policy.
Let Nτ denote the set of parties holding voting rights in period τ . In each period τ in
which at least two parties hold voting rights, two parties i, j ∈ Nτ are randomly matched
to negotiate with one another, and one of them is randomly selected to make an offer. We
let ρij and pij denote the probability that i and j are matched and i is selected to make
an offer when Nτ = {i, j} and Nτ = N resp.
The proposer i can offer to buy or sell voting rights, or choose not to make an offer. A
feasible transaction is an exchange of a party’s voting rights for a numeraire, which we
refer to as favors. If i sells its votes to j, i votes as instructed by j, and is excluded
from further negotiations. We let tij(k) denote the net transfer of favors from i to j that
follows a deal when i and j are matched and i proposed to j given voting rights k. We
say that i makes a relevant offer to j when i makes an offer to j that j will accept. In any
period τ in which a party i has a majority of the votes after trade (k′i ≥ r ≡
∑
i ki/2),
party i can choose whether to implement its preferred policy zi or extend negotiations.
When a party chooses to implement its preferred policy, the game ends immediately and
the policy zi is implemented forever. In any period τ prior to the implementation of a
new policy, the outcome is the status quo Q.
3See also Melo (2012), who studies middlemen in networks, extending Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987)
to this environment.
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Party i’s preferences are represented by the utility function
Vi =
∞∑
τ=0
δτ [(1− δ)ui(yτ )− tτi ] ,
where ui(·) is uniquely maximized at zi, and we normalize ui(Q) = 0 for all i. yτ denotes
the policy implemented in period τ , and tτi denotes the τ period net transfer from i to
others. We say that i dominates j (i  j) if i’s willingness to pay for implementing
zi instead of zj exceeds j’s willingness to pay for implementing zj instead of zi; i.e., if
u∗i − ui(zj) ≥ u∗j − uj(zi). Equivalently, letting Sij(y) denote the aggregate surplus for i
and j of implementing y, i.e., Sij(y) ≡ ui(y)+uj(y), we say that i j if Sij(zi) > Sij(zj).
An equilibrium is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). A trading state is a pair ((i, j),k),
where (i, j) denotes that i is matched with j and i is selected to propose, and k denotes
the pre-trade allocation of voting rights. We let W iij(k, buy) and W
i
ij(k, sell) denote i’s
equilibrium payoff from her best relevant buy and sell offers in trading state ((i, j),k),
and W iij(k, wait) i’s equilibrium payoff from not making a relevant offer. Then W
i
ij(k) ≡
maxaW
i
ij(k, a), for a ∈ {buy, sell, wait}, denotes i’s equilibrium payoff in trading state
((i, j),k). We also let W i(k) ≡ E[W iij(k)], where the expectation is taken over all possible
realizations of matches and proposing power. Finally, because a party with a majority of
the votes after trading can choose to implement its preferred policy or extend negotiations,
we also need to consider i’s post-trade equilibrium payoff after trade opportunities resulted
in a vote endowment k, which we denote by Bi(k).
4 Preliminaries
In this section, we present two building blocks for the analysis of broker equilibria in
Section 5. In Section 4.1 we analyze the final bargaining stage, in which only two parties
control voting rights. The analysis of this stage is not ‘off-the-shelve’ because the party
with a majority of the votes can choose to either extend negotiations or implement its
preferred policy following disagreement. This feature introduces interesting differences in
the analysis with respect to a standard bilateral bargaining game, where negotiations are
extended by default after disagreement.In Section 4.2 we begin analyzing the trade-offs
parties face in decentralized bargaining, and characterize parties’ optimal actions in each
decision node as a function of the continuation values.
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4.1 Majority-Minority Bargaining
We begin by analyzing the final bargaining stage, in which only two parties control voting
rights. Because of simple majority rule, one of these parties, i, has a majority of the votes.
We call i the majority party, and index it by M , and j 6= i the minority party, m. The
main result of this section characterizes MPE and MPE payoffs of the majority-minority
bargaining game. For simplicity of exposition, throughout this section we denote the
trading nodes in which the majority and minority propose simply by M and m (instead
of Mm and mM), and write the joint surplus SMm(x) as S(x).
Equilibrium behavior in the majority-minority bargaining game relies on two key factors.
The first is the parties’ relative intensity of preferences for the majority and minority
policies zM and zm. This is standard. WhenM  m, total surplus is higher if the majority
alternative is implemented. As a result, there is no transfer that the minority party would
be willing to offer that would compensate the majority party for not implementing its
preferred policy zM . In this case, there is a MPE in which there is no trade, and the
majority party implements its preferred policy.4 When instead m  M , there are gains
from trade. Whether these gains from trade are realized, and how they are distributed,
depends on the parties’ perception of their relative bargaining power.
The key factor here is the option that the majority party has to implement its preferred
policy without the consent of the minority party. Differently to a standard bilateral
bargaining game (where negotiations are automatically extended after disagreement),
here the majority party can either reject an offer and extend negotiations, in which
case Bj(k) = δW j(k), or reject it and implement its preferred policy, in which case
Bj(k) = uj(zM). The threat of implementing its preferred policy after unsuccessful trad-
ing (UT), however, is not always credible, and therefore not always relevant to determine
how gains from trade are distributed. In fact, the majority party has incentives to imple-
ment its preferred policy after UT only if u∗M ≥ δWM(k), and otherwise prefers to extend
negotiations for an additional period.5
4 If in addition u∗M < δρMS(zM ), there also exists a MPE in which m pays M so that it implements zM
immediately. In this equilibrium M offers to buy from m at a negative price (or accepts only a negative
price offer), threatening m with maintaining the status quo after disagreement. This is interesting in itself,
but largely irrelevant for our main argument, with the exception of the uniqueness claim in Theorem 5.4.
We return to this point in the proof of this theorem.
5This is similar to bargaining games with outside options (see for example Muthoo (1999)). However,
in bargaining games with outside options it is assumed that the party receiving the offer can reject the offer
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This off-equilibrium-path choice has important consequences for equilibrium behavior and
the distribution of rents in majority-minority bargaining. Consider the problem of the
majority party when it has an opportunity to propose. M can buy or sell votes to m,
generating payoffs
WMM (k, sell) = S(zm)−Bm(k) and WMM (k, buy) = S(zM)−Bm(k),
or it can choose not to make m a relevant offer, yielding WMM (k, wait) = B
M(k). The key
here is that M ’s payoffs for waiting and trading votes depend on the reservation values
BM(k) and Bm(k), which in turn depend on whether M prefers to implement its preferred
policy or extend negotiations after UT.
Given equilibrium beliefs about play after UT and the proposer’s payoffs associated with
each choice at the proposing stage, we can characterize parties’ optimal actions in each
decision node as a function of the continuation values. Using these results, wecharacterize
equilibria of the majority-minority bargaining game.
Proposition 4.1 Consider a Majority-Minority Bargaining Game starting in period τ0,
and suppose mM . Then there exists a MPE in which the minority party buys the votes
of the majority party independently of who has the opportunity to propose and implements
its preferred policy; i.e., yτ = zm for all τ ≥ τ0. Moreover,
1. If u∗M ≤ δρMS(zm), the majority party extends negotiations after UT. Here W l(k) =
ρlS(zm) for l = m,M and u
∗
M ≤ δWM(k).
2. If u∗M ≥ δρMS(zm) and (1 − δ)u∗M ≥ δρM [S(zm)− S(zM)], the majority party
implements zM after UT. Here W
l(k) = ul(zM) + ρl(S(zm)− S(zM)) for l = m,M ,
and u∗M ≥ δWM(k).
3. If neither of these conditions hold, there is no MPE in pure strategies. In equilib-
rium, the majority party implements its preferred policy after UT with probability
α∗ =
(1− δ)
δρM
(
u∗M − δρMS(zm)
δS(zm)− S(zM)
)
Here δWM(k) = u∗M and δW
m(k) = δS(zm)− u∗M .
and take her outside option. This counterbalances the proposal power of the other party. In our game,
instead, it is only the majority party who can implement its preferred policy after UT, independently of
whether it is the proposer or the receiver of the offer. This difference in the sequence introduces relatively
large changes in the equilibrium of the game.
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As part three of the Proposition makes clear, establishing existence of equilibrium in the
majority-minority bargaining game requires using mixed strategies. This is because the
majority’s option to extend negotiations or implement its preferred policy after UT creates
a discontinuity in payoffs that leads to nonexistence of a MPE in pure strategies.6 Mixing
after UT smoothes out this discontinuity in equilibrium payoffs and restores existence.
A critical implication of Proposition 4.1 is that conjectures of equilibrium play after dis-
agreement are fundamental for the analysis of equilibria with intermediaries. If the joint
payoff of implementing the minority policy is not large enough, or the majority can’t
appropriate a large fraction of this surplus (δρMS(zm) < u
∗
M), the majority implements
its preferred policy after UT with positive probability, and in equilibrium u∗M ≥ δWM(k).
But in this case the majority-minority bargaining node wouldn’t be reached in the first
place. This is because the decision problem of the majority party after UT in bilateral
bargaining is equivalent to its decision problem after acquiring the majority in decen-
tralized bargaining. It follows that for an equilibrium with intermediaries to exist it is
essential that the broker’s relevant threat after disagreement in bilateral bargaining is not
to implement its preferred policy after UT, and hence that
u∗M ≤ δρMS(zm). (1)
4.2 Trade-Offs in Decentralized Bargaining
In this section, we discuss the basic trade-offs parties face in decentralized bargaining, and
characterize parties’ optimal actions in each decision node as a function of the continuation
values. To do this we exploit the fact that in each node, only one player moves at a time.
We can therefore solve for the proposer’s best response by comparing the payoff she would
obtain with the best relevant buy and sell offers, and with the payoff resulting from not
making a relevant offer at all (either waiting for new meetings to occur, or possibly to
implement its preferred policy if she already has a majority).
6To see why this is the case, suppose that in equilibrium the majority party implements its preferred
policy after UT. This generates a payoff for the majority party ofWM = u∗M+ρM [S(zm)−S(zM )]. But the
majority party has an incentive to implement its preferred policy after UT if and only if u∗M ≥ δWM (k).
Thus, this is a credible threat in equilibrium if and only if (1 − δ)u∗M ≥ δρM [S(zm)− S(zM )]. Suppose
instead that the majority party extends negotiations after UT. Then WM = ρMS(zm), and M has
an incentive to extend negotiations after UT if and only if u∗M ≤ δρMS(zm). When neither of these
conditions hold, there is no MPE in pure strategies.
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In fact, as we show in Lemma 8.2 (in the Appendix), in order to characterize negotiations
between i and j it is enough to analyze the problem of party i when it is its turn to
propose to j. Since the proposer can appropriate the joint expected surplus net of the
parter’s post-trade reservation value, then for any i, j ∈ N and k,
W jji(k, buy) +B
i(k) = W iij(k, sell) +B
j(k).
From this it follows that i prefers selling to buying in ((i, j),k) if and only if j prefers
buying to selling in ((j, i),k). Similarly, i prefers selling to extending negotiations in
((i, j),k) if and only if j prefers buying to extending negotiations in ((j, i),k).
Best responses in decentralized bargaining depend of course on the initial distribution
of voting rights. With majority rule, however, only two classes of vote allocations are
strategically relevant: either one of the parties has a majority of the votes – and can
therefore implement its preferred policy if it chooses to – or no party controls a majority.
In our main analysis we will assume that one party (party 1) has a majority of the votes,
and that the two other parties, 2 and 3, control minority shares. We do this because this
initial allocation of voting rights appear intuitively to be less conducive to the existence
of brokers. We study the case of no majority party in Section 6.1.
Our first result characterizes the equilibrium payoffs of the proposer for waiting, or making
a relevant buy or sell offer when the majority party 1 meets minority party j. We know
already that W 11j(k, wait) = B
1(k), where Bi(k) = ui(z1) for i = 1, j if u
∗
1 ≥ δW 1(k),
and otherwise Bi(k) = δW i(k). Proposition 4.2 characterizes 1’s equilibrium payoffs for
selling and buying votes. By Lemma 8.2, it is enough to focus on 1’s payoff in the proposal
node 1j.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose party 1 meets with party j, and party h is unmatched. If there
is a trade (either a sell or a buy), call s ∈ {1, j} the seller, and b ∈ {1, j} the buyer, and
let k′bh denote the resulting vote endowment. Then
W 11j(k, trade) =
{
Π(sb, h)−Bj(k) if h b and u∗b < δρbhSbh(zh),
S1j(zb)−Bj(k) otherwise,
where Π(sb, u) ≡ δ[W s(k′bu)+W b(k′bu)] = δ[us(zu)+ρbuSbh(zu)] is the aggregate discounted
value of a buyer b and seller s when b resales to an ultimate buyer u.
11
The condition that h b and u∗b < δρbhSbh(zh) determines whether the buyer in the trade
between 1 and j will go on to sell to the remaining party, or instead just buy to implement
its preferred policy. Suppose for example that the condition holds when 1 sells to 3; i.e.,
2  3 and u∗3 < δρ32S32(z2). Then 1’s payoff from selling to 3 is the joint discounted
equilibrium payoff for 1 and 3 of putting 3 in a position to sell the majority to 2, Π(13, 2),
net of party 3’s reservation value B3(k). When instead this condition doesn’t hold, the
value for 1 of selling to 3 is instead given by the joint surplus for 1 and 3 of implementing
z3 net of party 3’s reservation value B
3(k).
Our second result characterizes the payoffs of the proposer when the two minority parties
meet in decentralized bargaining. The result is similar to that of Proposition 4.2, with
the exception that the relevant aggregate surplus for buyer (b) and seller (s) in case of
further trades is not given by what b can obtain by resaling to an ultimate buyer (u),
Π(sb, u), but instead by what the buyer can obtain by consolidating the minority vote
and then buying again from an ultimate seller (`), Π˜(sb, `).
Proposition 4.3 Suppose party 2 meets with party 3. If there is a trade (either sell or
buy), call s ∈ {2, 3} the seller, and b ∈ {2, 3} the buyer, and let k′b1 denote the resulting
vote endowment. Then for i, j ∈ {2, 3},
W i23(k, trade) =
{
Π˜(sb, 1)−Bj(k) if b 1 and u∗1 < δρ1bS1b(zb),
S23(z1)−Bj(k) otherwise.
where Π˜(sb, `) ≡ δ[W s(k′b`) +W b(k′b`)] = δ[us(zb) + ρb`Sb`(zb)] is the aggregate discounted
value of a buyer b and a seller s when b buys again from an ultimate seller `.
Consider for example 2’s payoffs from making 3 a relevant buy offer when it is its turn
to propose. When 2  1 and u∗1 < δρ12S12(z2), the payoff for 2 of making 3 a relevant
buy offer is the joint discounted equilibrium payoff for 2 and 3 of getting 2 to buy votes
from 1, Π˜(32, 1), minus 3’s reservation value B3(k). When instead 2  1, or 1  2 but
u∗1 ≥ δρ12S12(z2), 1 implements z1 immediately after 2 consolidates 2 and 3’s votes, so the
payoff for 2 of making 3 a relevant buy offer is simply their joint surplus of inducing 1 to
implement z1 immediately, net of 3’s reservation value B
3(k).
Propositions 4.2-4.3 can be used to check the consistency of any proposed equilibrium. In
Section 5 we use these results to study the existence of an equilibrium with intermediaries.
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5 Main Results
In this section, we establish our main results on the existence of intermediaries in decen-
tralized bargaining (Theorems 5.4 and 5.11). We show that under generic conditions on
matching probabilities there exists a compact set of preference profiles that admit an equi-
librium with intermediaries in decentralized bargaining. We then discuss the implications
of this result for welfare and policy outcomes in Section 5.2, and characterize conditions
on preference profiles under which equilibria with brokers can and cannot arise in Section
5.3.
In section 5.1, we establish conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with intermedi-
aries under two types of constraints: (1) a restriction on strategies, and (2) a restriction
on preferences. Together, they assure that on the equilibrium path, trade only occurs
through the broker (by (1)), and that relative to the equilibrium of legislative bargaining
without the broker, the presence of the broker changes outcomes (by (2)).
Part 1 is our definition of a broker equilibrium (BE). Note that because party 1 has a
majority of the votes and without loss of generality 2  3, in any equilibrium with an
intermediary party 3 brokers a deal between 1 and 2 that implements 2’s preferred policy.
This still leaves negotiations between 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3 unspecified. To assure
that the broker is not merely replicating indirectly a trade that would also occur directly,
we require that in a broker equilibrium parties 1 and 2 do not trade when they meet. We
also ask that the trade enabled by the broker occurs on the equilibrium path independently
of the realization of meetings that occur. This requires that party 2 does not trade with
1 or 3 in decentralized bargaining, and that 1 extends negotiations after this occurs.7
The second constraint, which we maintain until section 5.4, is a restriction on preferences.
Since one of the minority parties will dominate the other, it is without loss of generality
to assume that 2  3. In Sections 5.1 - 5.3, moreover, we also assume that 1  2 and
1  3. These conditions imply that in bilateral bargaining with 2 or 3, party 1 would
implement its preferred policy without trading (see Proposition 4.1). Thus, whenever it
exists, a broker enables a trade that would otherwise not occur, causing a change in policy
7We emphasize here that establishing the existence of a broker equilibrium therefore establishes the
existence of an equilibrium with intermediaries when we do not include these additional requirements on
equilibrium behavior. Thus, the set of parameters under which a broker equilibrium can be supported is
a subset of the set of parameters under which any equilibrium with intermediaries can be supported.
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outcomes. In Section 5.4 we extend Theorem 5.4 to all dominance relations.
5.1 Intermediaries in Legislative Bargaining
Implementing a BE in decentralized trading introduces equilibrium incentive constraints.
Two are straightforward, and independent of the dominance relations among parties.
First, we require that party 1 extends negotiations after UT in decentralized trading
(after not trading with 2, or after 2 and 3 do not trade)
u∗1 ≤ δW 1(k) (2)
Second, we need 3 to extend negotiations after buying votes from 1, in order to broker
a deal with 2. As we discussed in Section 4.1 above, this is in fact the same strategic
problem faced by party 3 after UT in the majority-minority bargaining game with 2 (with
M = 3 and m = 2). Thus after 3 acquires the majority from 1 in decentralized trading,
it will extend negotiations if and only if 2 3 (as we are assuming throughout) and 8
u∗3 ≤ δρ32S23(z2) (3)
The remaining constraints come from parties best responses in each decision node. First,
we require that whenever 1 and 3 meet, 1 sells its votes to 3. Given 2  3 and u∗3 ≤
δρ32S23(z2), we know that if 3 were to buy 1’s votes, it would go on to broker a deal with
2. Thus from Proposition 4.2, W 113(k; sell) = Π(13, 2)− δW 3(k). If instead 1 were to buy
3’s votes, W 113(k; buy) = S13(z1) − δW 3(k), because with 1  2 there are no gains from
trade between 1 and 2 in majority-minority bargaining. Thus 1 prefers selling to buying
iff
Π(13, 2) ≥ S13(z1), (4)
and prefers selling to extending negotiations if and only if
Π(13, 2) ≥ δ[W 1(k) +W 3(k)]. (5)
8In some cases the party who carries or acquires a majority in decentralized trading will be indifferent
between extending negotiations and implementing its preferred policy. To assure the robustness of our
results, we brake this indifference against an equilibrium with brokers, and assume hereafter that in any
such case the party with a majority of the votes implements its preferred policy.
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Second, when 1 and 2 meet, we ask that they do not trade. Now, given that 1  3
and 2  3, neither 1 nor 2 has a further gain from trade with party 3 in bilateral
trading, and thus from Proposition 4.2, W 112(k; buy) = S12(z1)−δW 2(k) andW 112(k; sell) =
S12(z2)− δW 2(k). And since 1 2, it follows that 1 would rather buy from 2 than sell to
2. Moreover, 1 prefers extending negotiations than making 2 a relevant buy offer if and
only if 1 and 2’s aggregate discounted continuation value is larger than their joint payoff
of implementing z1, i.e.,
S12(z1) ≤ δ[W 1(k) +W 2(k)]. (6)
Finally, we also need that parties 2 and 3 do not reach an agreement to trade when
they meet. But given 1  3 and 1  2, the analysis is very similar to the one above,
for an uneventful meeting between 1 and 2. Here party 1 implements its preferred policy
immediately after 2 sells to 3 or 3 sells to 2, but extends negotiations if 2 and 3 fail to reach
an agreement (Proposition 4.3). Then W 223(k; sell) = W
2
23(k; buy) = S23(z1) − δW 3(k),
and 2 prefers not to make a relevant offer in ((2, 3),k) than to sell or buy from 3 if and
only if
S23(z1) ≤ δ[W 2(k) +W 3(k)]. (7)
Conditions (2)-(7) are necessary and sufficient for a BE, given the continuation values.
Continuation values, in turn, are determined by equilibrium strategies, independently
of the dominance relation or incentive compatibility constraints. They can be easily
computed for an equilibrium with brokers.9
Lemma 5.1 Consider a MPE in which party 3 brokers a deal between 1 and 2. Then
W 2(k) =
δ(p13 + p31)ρ23S23(z2)
(1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31) ,
W 1(k) =
p13Π(13, 2)
(1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31) and W
3(k) =
p31Π(13, 2)
(1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31)
Substituting the values from Lemma 5.1 in the equilibrium conditions (2)-(7), we have
the following result. For this, and the remainder of the paper, it is useful to define
υ ≡ (1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31), θ ≡ p13 + p31ρ23, µ ≡ p31 + p13ρ23
9The reader might notice that W 1(k)/(W 1(k) +W 3(k)) = p13/(p13 + p31), which is equivalent to the
equilibrium payoffs of the unique equilibrium in the standard bilateral bargaining game.
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Lemma 5.2 Suppose (1  2  3, 1  3). There exists a BE if and only if there are
payoffs ui(zj) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N such that the following system of linear inequalities is
satisfied:
υu∗1 − δ2p13u1(z2)− δ2p13ρ32u∗2 − δ2p13ρ32u3(z2) ≤ 0 (2b)
−δρ32u∗2 − δρ32u3(z2) + u∗3 ≤ 0 (3b)
u∗1 + u3(z1)− δu1(z2)− δρ32u∗2 − δρ32u3(z2) ≤ 0 (4b)
−u1(z2)− ρ32u∗2 − ρ32u3(z2) ≤ 0 (5b)
υu∗1 + υu2(z1)− δ2p13u1(z2)− δ2θu∗2 − δ2θu3(z2) ≤ 0 (6b)
υu2(z1) + υu3(z1)− δ2p31u1(z2)− δ2µu∗2 − δ2µu3(z2) ≤ 0, (7b)
Since this is a homogeneous system, we know that it has a solution when all parties
are indifferent between all alternatives, i.e., ui(zj) = 0 for all i, j ∈ N . This situation,
however, is not too interesting. We want to know if there can be a BE when each party
has a strict preference for its own ideal policy. Formally, we ask that u ∈ U , where
U ≡ {u ∈ R9 : −u∗i < 0,−u∗i + ui(zj) < 0 ∀i = 1, 2, 3, j 6= i}
The equilibrium conditions (2)-(7) together with the requirement that u ∈ U , and the
dominance relations (1  2  3, 1  3), still form a system of linear inequalities in the
unknowns ui(zj), which can be written as Au ≤ α, for a matrix of coefficients A, where
uT =
(
u∗1 u2(z1) u3(z1) u1(z2) u
∗
2 u3(z2) u1(z3) u2(z3) u
∗
3
)
,
αT ≡ (09,−b9), and A is an m× 9 matrix, whose elements are functions of the matching
parameters G ≡ (p, ρ, δ) ∈ G ≡ ∆6× (∆2)3× [0, 1] (here ∆n is the unit n-simplex). Thus,
proving that there exists u ∈ U that admits a BE boils down to proving that the system
of linear inequalities Au ≤ α has a solution. At this point, the following result is useful:
Lemma 5.3 (Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 22.1) Let ai ∈ Rn, with elements ai1, . . . , ain
and αi ∈ R for i = 1, . . . ,m. Then one and only one of the following alternatives holds:
1. There exists a vector u ∈ Rn, with elements u1, . . . , un, such that
n∑
j=1
aijuj ≤ αi for all i = 1, . . . ,m
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2. There exist non-negative real numbers λ1, . . . , λm such that
m∑
i=1
λiaij = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n and
m∑
i=1
λiαi < 0.
Using Lemma 5.3, we can prove our first main result. We show that there exist preference
profiles that admit a BE if and only if
(1− δρ32)υ ≤ δ2θ, (8)
Furthermore, the result is generic, in the sense that small changes in the parameters of
the game do not affect the existence of a broker equilibrium. To state this result we define
P ≡ {G ∈ G : condition (8) holds}.
Theorem 5.4 Suppose (1 2 3, 1 3), and k1 ≥ r.
1. Take G ∈ G. There exists a compact set CG ⊂ U such that for any u ∈ CG, the
legislative bargaining game with parameters (G, u) admits a broker equilibrium if and
only if G ∈ P.
2. For every G ∈ intP there is an open subset P ⊂ P containing G, and an open subset
U ⊂ U , such that for any (G′, u) ∈ P × U , (G′, u) admits a broker equilibrium.
3. Whenever a broker equilibrium exists, it is the unique equilibrium in which z2 is the
policy outcome, and there is no equilibrium in which z3 is the policy outcome.
Note that increasing ρ32 relaxes (8), and thus expands the conditions under which there is a
BE. The intuition is as follows. Increasing the likelihood that the broker has agenda setting
power in majority-minority bargaining has the direct effect of increasing its bargaining
power, and therefore the share of the surplus it can obtain when negotiating with the
ultimate buyer. As a result, party 3 is now more inclined to negotiate with party 2 instead
of implementing its preferred policy after obtaining 1’s votes, in line with equilibrium.10
Increasing p13 or p31, on the other hand, has both a distributive and an income effect.
10Increasing ρ32 also has indirect effects on bargaining incentives in decentralized trading. In particular,
since 3 is now more able to extract surplus from 2, reaching the majority minority stage is not as desirable
for party 2 (7b-8b). Condition (8) therefore says that the tightening of the constraints (7b) and (8b)
never overpowers the loosening of the constraints (3-6).
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While raising p13 (p31) directly increases the effectiveness of the brokerage and equilibrium
payoffs, it also improves (resp, deteriorates) the bargaining position of the majority party
vis a vis the broker. Thus, changes in p13 and p31 can in general increase or reduce the
space for brokers. Simple calculus shows, however, that increasing p31 tightens condition
(8) and increasing p13 relaxes (8) whenever this is satisfied. Thus, if for some configuration
of parameters the set of preference profiles admitting a BE is nonempty, this will also be
the case after reducing p31 or increasing p13.
Reducing bargaining frictions, on the other hand, unambiguously expands the conditions
under which there is a BE. In fact, increasing δ not only relaxes condition (8) but also
weakly relaxes each of the equilibrium constraints (2)-(7). It follows that reducing bar-
gaining frictions increases the set of preference profiles for which there is a BE. In addition,
since condition (8) is always satisfied in the limit as δ → 1, we have that as bargaining
frictions vanish, there is always a preference profile for which there is a BE. This shows
that the existence of broker equilibria does not require that 1 and 2 have few opportunities
to trade.
5.2 Outcomes and Welfare
As we discussed earlier, the dominance relation (1  2  3, 1  3) is particularly
interesting because in this case party 1 would not trade with 2 if party 3 were not present,
and would not trade with 3 if 2 were not present. Thus, the presence of the broker
unambiguously changes policy outcomes vis a vis a two party legislature. Furthermore,
we have constructed BE so that 1 and 2 do not trade directly when they meet. Thus
in this equilibrium the broker is creating a trade that would not occur without him. In
addition, the second part of Theorem 5.4 establishes that there is no equilibrium in which
1 and 2 trade directly. We conclude that the broker is creating a trade that would not
have occurred without it, in this or any other equilibrium.
The fact that brokers enable transactions that wouldn’t have occurred in their absence
does not imply that parties 1 and 2 are better off with than without brokers. Note that
the values of the game in which only parties 1 and 2 are present are given by Wˆ 1 (k) = u∗1
and Wˆ 2 (k) = u2 (z1). Since in an equilibrium with brokers u
∗
1 < δW
1 (k), it is immediate
to verify that the majority party benefits from the existence of the broker. However, from
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Lemma 5.1,
∆W 2(k) =
δ (p13 + p31) ρ23S23(z2)
[(1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31)] − u2 (z1) ,
which in general can be positive or negative. Thus the ultimate buyer might prefer that
no trades were set in motion in the first place.
In fact, the broker equilibrium is generally not efficient, even as frictions vanish. This
follows immediately with δ < 1 because while efficiency requires that every meeting ends
in agreement, in equilibrium the majority party 1 and the ultimate buyer 2 only trade
through the broker (and do not trade directly when they meet). Now, in the limit with
δ → 1, it is still possible that equilibrium payoffs approach efficiency. We show however
that this is not the case generically.11 Note that from Lemma 5.1, parties’ aggregate
welfare in an equilibrium with brokers is given by∑
W i(k) =
δ(p13 + p31)[u1(z2) + u
∗
2 + u3(z2)]
(1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31)
so that
∑
W i(k) → u1(z2) + u∗2 + u3(z2) as δ → 1. It is then enough to show that there
is a preference profile u ∈ U with the property that ∑i ui(z2) < ∑i ui(z3) admitting an
equilibrium with brokers with δ → 1. It can be verified that this happens for example
with the preferences of Table 1, given uniform matching.
Party/Policy z1 z2 z3 Q
1 10 -485 0 0
2 505 1000 990 0
3 10 10 20 0
Table 1: A Preference Profile admitting an Inefficient Equilibrium with Brokers with
uniform matching and δ → 1.
On the other hand, broker equilibria are always welfare improving (for all δ):
11This result contrasts the second result in Gul (1989), which establishes efficiency for δ → 1. It
should be pointed out, however, that the two games have important differences. First, Gul requires strict
superadditivity on the payoffs, a property that our majority game doesn’t satisfy (it is superadditive but
not strictly superadditive). Second, Gul’s efficiency result requires superadditivity of the continuation
values (his condition VA). This property is not satisfied in our game either. As a result, efficiency is not
guaranteed, even in the limit as δ → 1.
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Remark 5.5 Suppose k1 ≥ r and (1 2 3, 2 3). In any equilibrium with brokers,∑
i
[W i (k)− ui (z1)] > 0
5.3 The Role of the Broker
Theorem 5.4 shows that under a broad set of conditions, there exists an equilibrium with
brokers. The theorem, however, says nothing about the preference profiles under which
brokers can emerge in equilibrium. Thus, while we know that when (8) is satisfied the
set of preference profiles that admit an equilibrium with brokers is nonempty (Theorem
5.4), it is still possible that these preference profiles are in some sense ’exceptional’, and
not likely to arise in applications. We show that this is not the case. We also establish
properties of the broker and the environment under which brokers emerge in equilibrium.12
We begin with an example. Figure 1 illustrates two preference profiles u, u′ ∈ U for
which there is an equilibrium with brokers (for the examples we assume δ = 0.95 and
uniform matching probabilities). These examples are interesting because they illustrate
very intuitively the two ways in which an equilibrium with brokers comes about.
In the profile plotted in the left panel, u, the party of the winning policy is willing to pay
a ‘large’ amount to move away from the status quo. Moreover, party 3 is both (i) willing
to trade with 2 in bilateral bargaining, and (ii) able to credibly use the status quo as an
outside option in these negotiations. Thus, by using 3 as a broker, 1 and 3 can lock in
party 2 in a situation that allows them to extract these rents. In the profile u′ depicted in
the right panel, instead, there is an equilibrium with brokers even if party 2 doesn’t have
strong preferences regarding z3, or about the status quo. What is financing the trade in
this case is the broker’s willingness to avoid her least preferred alternative in exchange for
her second best.
The contrast between these two cases poses an interesting question: can a party act as a
broker if it only cares about rents? Our next result shows that this cannot be the case:
12To obtain these results, we further exploit the duality results from convex analysis, transforming
restrictions on preference profiles into a modified matrix A′ of matching parameters, and obtaining
conditions for existence of a solution to the underlying system of inequalities following the same steps as
in Theorem 5.4. The various results in this section, therefore, illustrate the power of the technique. The
particular algebraic derivations in each case, however, are not interesting per se, and are relegated to an
online appendix.
20
z1	   z2	   z3	   Q	  
1	   498	   272	   -­‐624	   0	  
2	   774	   1000	   -­‐377	   0	  
3	   -­‐227	   886	   896	   0	  
-­‐800	  
-­‐600	  
-­‐400	  
-­‐200	  
0	  
200	  
400	  
600	  
800	  
1000	  
1200	  
z1	   z2	   z3	   Q	  
1	   282	   272	   -­‐332	   0	  
2	   990	   1000	   990	   0	  
3	   282	   886	   896	   0	  
-­‐400	  
-­‐200	  
0	  
200	  
400	  
600	  
800	  
1000	  
1200	  
u u′
Figure 1: Two preference profiles u, u′ ∈ U s.t. 1  2  3 and 1  3 for which there is
an equilibrium with brokers (uniform matching probs and δ = 0.95).
in order to have an equilibrium with brokers, the party acting as broker must have a
stake in the policy outcome. In other words, for all u ∈ U such that u3(zj) = u3(Q) = 0
for j = 1, 2, 3, and any matching parameters G, the game (G, u) does not admit an
equilibrium with brokers. In fact, the broker must strictly prefer z2 to both the status
quo and the preferred policy of the party whose votes it buys in decentralized trading.
Proposition 5.6 Suppose (1  2  3, 1  3), and k1 ≥ r. If the (potential) bro-
ker weakly prefers either the status quo or the policy of the initial majority to that of
the ultimate buyer (u3(z2) ≤ u3(Q), or u3(z2) ≤ u3(z1)), there does not exist a broker
equilibrium.
The first order implication of Proposition 5.6 is that the party acting as broker must
have a stake in the policy outcome. The result, however, goes well beyond this. Since
the broker must prefer implementing z2 to the status quo, it increases the aggregate
surplus of implementing z2 relative to inaction. In addition, Proposition 5.6 shows that
the broker must also prefer implementing z2 to z1. As a result, whenever there is a
broker equilibrium, the broker must also increase the aggregate surplus of implementing
z2 relative to the majority policy. The next remark shows that this additional value is at
least partly appropriated by the majority party, ultimately inducing 1 and 2 not to trade
directly.
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Remark 5.7 Suppose (1 2 3, 1 3), and k1 ≥ r. In a broker equilibrium, the net
expected transfer to party 3 is negative.
One should not conclude from this that the broker is the only source of compensation
to the majority party. In fact, the strategic environment must be such that the broker
can extract sufficient rents from the ultimate buyer, putting in motion a chain of rent
extraction. To illustrate this, we show that in a binary policy environment (X = {Q,A}),
as in Philipson and Snyder (1996) and Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012), a
broker equilibrium cannot exist. In fact, the model with three alternatives is the minimal
structure for which brokers can arise.13 This minimal diversity of the space of alternatives
is in fact needed for the broker to be able to extract enough rents from the ultimate buyer.
Proposition 5.8 Suppose (1  2  3, 1  3), k1 ≥ r. If there is an equilibrium with
brokers, then for any i, j ∈ N , zi 6= zj. Therefore |X| ≥ 3. Moreover, if ρ23 < δ/(1 + δ),
then zi 6= Q ∀i ∈ N , and |X| = 4.
To see why this is the case, note that by Proposition 5.6, party 3 must strictly prefer
z2 to Q and z1. Thus, if there is a broker equilibrium in the binary policy setting, it
must be that z3 = z2 6= Q = z1. But then since z3 = z2, party 3 would be unable to
extract sufficient rents from 2 in bilateral bargaining to dissuade him from implementing
his preferred policy immediately after buying 1’s votes. In addition, Proposition 5.8 also
establishes that if ρ23 < δ/(1 + δ), all policies must be different than the status quo, and
thus |X| ≥ 4. This implies, in particular, that when ρ23 is small enough there cannot
exist a broker equilibrium if the status quo already reflects the preferred position of the
majority party.14
Proposition 5.8 shows that a minimal diversity in the space of alternatives is necessary to
create a bargaining situation in which the broker can profitably carry out the deal. This
13Proposition 5.6 implies that at least the broker must perceive a difference between z2 and z1. However,
this still allows z1 = Q, and is silent about z3 and z2, because it assumes that u∗3 > u3(z2).
14The intuition for this result hinges on the incentives for 2 not to make a relevant offer to 1 or 3
in decentralized bargaining. Because when ρ23 is small, party 2’s expected surplus out of the majority-
minority bargaining stage with 3 is small as well, party 2 is willing to pay more to (or demand less from)
parties 1 and 3 in decentralized bargaining in order to implement z1 immediately. Thus, in order for 2
to be willing to comply with the equilibrium path of play, the cost for 2 of buying from 1 or 3 when
ρ23 becomes smaller should increase. Attaining this without affecting other incentive constraints requires
reducing u2(z1)− u2(Q), but this presupposes that z1 6= Q.
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suggests the question of whether conventional restrictions on preferences profiles would
make the existence of brokers impossible. Does the existence of brokers relies in some way
on pathological preference profiles? A way to implement this question is to study whether
brokers can exist with a standard notion of ‘well-behaved’ preferences, as for example the
class of single-peaked preference profiles, USP . This is what we do in the next result.
Proposition 5.9 Suppose (1  2  3, 1  3), and k1 ≥ r. Then if (1 − δρ32)υ <
min{δ2θ, δ2µ}, there exists a compact set C ⊂ USP such that all u ∈ C admit a broker
equilibrium.
In fact, linear and quadratic payoffs are also admissible. Figure 5.3 illustrates this with
two examples. Given the normalization ui(Q) = 0, i’s payoff function is ui(x) = −βi(x−
zi)
2 + βi(Q− zi)2 in the case of the quadratic utility function, and similarly for the linear
payoffs. Note that i  j iff βi > βj. Thus, in these examples, β2 > β3. This must be
the case, because the ultimate buyer has to dominate the broker so that there is a final
transaction. In addition, per Proposition 5.6, u3(z2) ≥ u3(z1) and u3(z2) ≥ u3(Q), which
in this context implies that the broker must be closer to z2 than to z1 or the status quo.
Thus, if for example z2 < z1 < Q as in the figure, the broker cannot be more right-winged
than the majority party.
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Figure 2: Quadratic and linear utility functions admitting an equilibrium with brokers.
Here ρ23 = 0.2, and p is uniform. δ = 0.95. β1 = 25, β2 = 20, β3 = 15.
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5.4 Broker Equilibria in All Dominance Relations
As we stated in Section 5.1, the trade-offs that parties face when negotiating with one
another in decentralized bargaining depend on their equilibrium beliefs about the out-
come of negotiations following each possible trade, on and off the path of play. And while
a BE is uniquely determined in the benchmark dominance relation, in general multiple
continuations are possible off the equilibrium path for different preferences and match-
ing parameters. Using Propositions 4.2 and 4.3, our next result characterizes all broker
equilibria. The values W i(k) are still determined by Lemma 5.1.
Proposition 5.10 Suppose k1 ≥ r. Suppose furthermore that u∗3 ≤ δρ32S23(z2) and
u∗1 ≤ δW 1(k). The following conditions characterize all broker equilibria.
1. 3 buys 1’s votes iff Π(13, 2) ≥ δ[W 1(k) +W 3(k)] and either (i) Π(13, 2) ≥ Π(31, 2),
if [2 1 and u∗1 ≤ δρ12S12(z2)], or (ii) Π(13, 2) ≥ S13(z1) otherwise.
2. If 1 extends negotiations after buying from 2 to sell its votes to 3 (3  1 and
u∗1 < δρ13S13(z3)), parties 1 and 2 would not trade after meeting iff either Π(21, 3) ≤
S12(z2) ≤ δ[W 1(k) +W 2(k)] or S12(z2) ≤ Π(21, 3) ≤ δ[W 1(k) +W 2(k)]. If party 1
implements z1 after buying from 2, iff δ[W
1(k) +W 2(k)] ≥ max{S12(z1), S12(z2)}.
3. Let i, j,∈ {2, 3}, i 6= j. If 1 extends negotiations after i sells to j (if j 
1 and u∗1 < δρ1jS1j(zj)), parties 2 and 3 would not trade with one another iff
Π˜(ij, 1) ≤ δ[W 2(k) + W 3(k)]. If instead 1 implements z1 after i sells to j, iff
Sij(z1) ≤ δ[W 2(k) +W 3(k)].
Note that equilibrium conditions (4)-(7) in section 5.1 come as a direct corollary of this
result: given 1 2, part 1 implies (4) and (5), given 1 3, part 2 implies (6), and given
1 2 3, part 3 implies (7). Note also that for this dominance relation, all equilibrium
continuations are uniquely determined. As a result, substituting the values from Lemma
5.1, the system (2)-(7) completely characterizes the set of parameters for which a broker
equilibrium exists.
In general, however, off-path continuations can vary for different parameters, even fixing
the dominance relation.15 As a result, changing parameters can change the equilibrium
15To illustrate this, consider a meeting between parties 1 and 3. In a broker equilibrium, we require
that 1 sells its votes to 3, who then brokers a deal with party 2. But suppose 1 deviates, and makes 3 a
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strategy profile in a BE. While this can appear daunting, in fact the set of all possible
BE can be described by the combination of the conditions in Proposition 5.10, together
with the conditions u∗3 ≤ δρ32S23(z2) and u∗1 ≤ δW 1(k). Using Proposition 5.10 we can
establish our second main result. This extends Theorem 5.4 to all dominace relations.
Theorem 5.11 Suppose k1 ≥ r. Then for any given dominance relation there is a com-
pact set of matching probabilities and preference profiles that admit an equilibrium with
brokers.
To prove the result, we first show that if there is a preference profile that admits brokers
when (1  2  3, 1  3), there is one that admits brokers with (1  2  3, 3 
1) (Proposition 9.2). Thus, the sufficient condition for brokers in Theorem 5.4 is also
sufficient for brokers whenever 1  2  3. We then extend the existence result to
the remaining dominance relations, and provide alternative conditions under which a
similar result holds when (2  3  1, 2  1) (Proposition 9.3) and (2  1  3, 2  3)
(Proposition 9.4). These proofs follow the logic of Theorem 5.4, and are therefore relegated
to the online appendix.
We had shown before, in Theorem 5.4, that under generic conditions on the matching
parameters (eq. (8)), there are preference profiles that admit a BE. Theorem 5.11 shows
that this is true for any given dominance relation. It follows that while the prevailing
dominance relation among parties can shape the characteristics of BE, and the parameters
under which any given broker strategy profile can be supported as an equilibrium, it
doesn’t determine the existence of BE in the first place.
6 Extensions and Applications
In the analysis so far, we focused on a majoritarian legislature where one of the parties
is initially endowed with a majority of the votes. The logic for the existence of brokers,
however, applies in a wider set of circumstances. In this section we consider some of these
relevant buy offer. If 1 2, as in the benchmark dominance, there are no gains from trade between 1 and
2, and 1 would implement its preferred policy after buying from 3. But if 2  1 and u∗1 ≤ δρ12S12(z2),
1 would sell to 2 in bilateral bargaining. Because 1 would have a larger “buy” payoff in the second case,
it is harder to dissuade him not to trade with 3 in the first place.
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extensions. We begin by considering a majoritarian legislature in which no party initially
has a majority of the votes. We then consider a committee operating under unanimity
rule, such as the Council of the European Union. Finally, we consider the possibility that
interest groups (actors not formally endowed with voting power) act as brokers. This
includes the President as a special case, if the President doesn’t have veto power. We
then consider the case of a President with veto. Throughout, we focus on the benchmark
dominance relation.
6.1 A Majoritarian Legislature with No Majority Party
Up to now we focused on the case in which one of the parties in the legislature has a
majority of the votes. However, in 45% of the seat distributions in presidential democracies
and 57% of seat distributions in parliamentary democracies, no party controlled a majority
of seats in the legislature (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004)). In these cases,
either minority parties form relatively stable policy coalitions, or policy compromises are
attained on a case-by-case basis.
Surprisingly enough, the absence of a majority party doesn’t seem to affect legislative
success, at least as measured by the proportion of government bills turned into law. In fact,
Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) report that single-party minority governments
are at least as successful as legislative coalitions (even majority coalitions). This points
to successful bargaining among parties even in minority situations. In this section we
investigate within our model whether the absence of a party holding the majority of
votes affect the conditions making the emergence of brokers possible. We focus again for
simplicity on the benchmark dominance relation (1 2 3, 1 3).
There are two fundamental differences in the incentive compatibility constraints needed to
support a given profile of trades between the two settings. The first is whether negotiations
are extended by default after UT (no majority party) or whether this is endogenous (a
majority party exists). The second is which party decides to extend negotiations or
implement its preferred policy after each particular trade. When party 1 has a majority,
any trade involving party 1 resolves in the buyer having a majority of the votes, but any
trade between the two minority parties leaves the majority unchanged. When no party
has a majority, on the other hand, any trade between any two parties resolves in the buyer
26
having a majority of the votes, independently of the initial distribution of voting rights.16
It follows that any node involving the majority party 1 remains unchanged, except for the
fact that we do not need to induce party 1 to extend negotiations in UT after meeting with
party 2 (we lose the constraint (2)). The fundamental difference with the majority party
case is that the party that emerges with the majority after trade in the node ((2, 3) ,k) can
choose between extending negotiations or implementing his preferred policy right away,
just as the buyer in a 1-2 or a 1-3 meeting in the majority party case. As a result, the
decisions of the proposer in 2-3 trading are now also governed by the payoffs in Lemma 4.2.
In effect, Lemma 4.2 now applies symmetrically to all matchings. Moreover, because no
party has a majority in UT, then W iij(k, wait) = B
i(k) = δW i(k) for i = 2, 3. Thus when
2 and 3 are matched and trade, with i, j ∈ {2, 3} and denoting the seller by s ∈ {2, 3}
and the buyer by b ∈ {2, 3},
W iij(k, trade) =
{
Π(sb, 1)− δW j(k) if 1 b and u∗b < δρb1Sb1(z1),
Sij(zb)− δW j(k) otherwise,
Using the previous result, and a logic similar to the one in Theorem 5.4, Proposition 6.1
provides sufficient conditions for the existence of brokers when no party holds a majority.
Proposition 6.1 Suppose (1  2  3, 1  3) and no party has a majority of the
votes. Then there exists a set (U, P ) ⊂ U × G, with nonempty interior, such that if
(u,G) ∈ (U, P ), there exists a broker equilibrium.
While a full analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this paper, Proposition 6.1 estab-
lishes that the presence of a majority party is not necessary for the emergence of brokers
in equilibrium.
6.2 Unanimity Rule
Here we consider a committee operating under unanimity rule, such as the Council of the
European Union. Consider then a small Europe, with Germany (1), Spain (2) and France
16There is a third difference once we lift the focus off a particular profile of trades. Even keeping the
dominance relations fixed, there are now multiple parties that can act as brokers. Here we focus on the
same brokerage as before, in which 3 brokers a deal between 1 and 2 to implement z2, for this is the only
equilibrium trade that can implement z2.
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(3) represented in the Council. Suppose Spain favors a fiscal bailout (z2), Germany a
fiscal tightening (z1), and France monetary easing (z3). Assume as before that (1 2
3, 1  3). This implies that Germany faces the steepest policy loss vis a vis Spain and
France, and that Spain cares more about the difference between bailout and monetary
easing than France. Can France broker a deal between Spain and Germany to carry out
a bailout?
The analysis of brokers in unanimity differs from our analysis under majority rule in that
no party can implement its preferred policy after UT in either decentralized or bilateral
bargaining, or after a single trade in decentralized bargaining. This feature changes the
negotiation tradeoffs at key points in the game.First, differently than in the case of a
majoritarian legislature, inaction is now a possible equilibrium outcome in the “majority-
minority” bargaining game. In fact, S (zm) ≥ 0 is necessary and sufficient for gridlock
not to occur. We state this result without proof.
Remark 6.2 Consider the “majority-minority” bilateral bargaining game among parties
i and j under unanimity rule at time τ0, and suppose i j. Then yτ = Q for all τ ≥ τ0
if Sij (zi) ≤ 0, and yτ = zi for all τ ≥ τ0 if Sij (zi) > 0.
It follows that for an equilibrium in which France (3) brokers a deal to bailout Spain (2) to
exist, we must have S23(z2) > 0; i.e., France and Spain must jointly gain from bailing out
Spain, relative to inaction.17 Incentives in decentralized trading change accordingly. Con-
sider for example negotiations between Spain (2) and France (3) in decentralized trading,
and suppose for concreteness that S13 (z1) ≥ 0 and S12 (z1) < 0. Because S13 (z1) ≥ 0, if
France were to buy out Spain, it would then sell its votes to Germany in bilateral bargain-
ing, and thus Π (23, 1) = δ[u2(z1) + ρ31S31(z1)], as in the benchmark case. But because
S12 (z1) < 0 (and therefore also S12 (z2) < 0, since 1  2), bilateral bargaining between
Germany and Spain would end in disagreement, and thus Π (32, 1) = 0. Thus, the fact
that Germany and Spain cannot agree on an alternative to the status quo diminishes the
incentives for France to sell its votes to Spain in decentralized trading.
With these modifications, the analysis of brokers with unanimity rule is similar to the
majoritarian case. Within the benchmark dominance relation, in fact, the conditions
17In fact, given the benchmark dominance, in any equilibrium in which yτ0 = z2, then S23(z2) > 0.
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S12 (z1) ≥≤ 0 and S13 (z1) ≥≤ 0 define four possible cases, and Table 6.2 summarizes the
relevant equilibrium conditions in decentralized trading (in addition to S23(z2) > 0).
S12 (z1) > 0 S12 (z1) > 0 S12 (z1) < 0 S12 (z1) < 0
S13 (z1) > 0 S13 (z1) < 0 S13 (z1) > 0 S13 (z1) < 0
1-3 sell & NT Π(13, 2) > δ(W 1 +W 3) δ(W 1 +W 3) δ(W 1 +W 3) δ(W 1 +W 3)
sell & buy Π˜(31, 2) Π˜(31, 2) 0 0
1-2 NT & sell δ(W 1 +W 2) > Π˜(12, 3) Π˜(12, 3) Π˜(12, 3) Π˜(12, 3)
NT & buy Π˜(21, 3) 0 Π˜(21, 3) 0
2-3 NT & sell δ(W 2 +W 3) > Π˜(23, 1) 0 Π˜(23, 1) 0
NT & buy Π˜(32, 1) Π˜(32, 1) 0 0
Table 2: Incentive Constraints in Decentralized Trading: Unanimity Rule
While a full analysis of the unanimity case is beyond the scope of this paper, two points
are worth mentioning. First, as the reader might suspect, it is possible to support a broker
equilibrium when S12 (z1) < 0 and S13 (z1) < 0, for in this case the broker is the only path
to realize gains from trade. However, we can show that a result similar to Theorem 5.4
holds for all possible configurations of these bilateral surpluses.
z1	   z2	   z3	   Q	  
1	   1000	   0	   -­‐480	   0	  
2	   -­‐333	   667	   -­‐641	   0	  
3	   -­‐333	   -­‐667	   10	   0	  
-­‐800	  
-­‐600	  
-­‐400	  
-­‐200	  
0	  
200	  
400	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800	  
1000	  
1200	  
z1	   z2	   z3	   Q	  
1	   20	   0	   -­‐493	   0	  
2	   980	   1000	   -­‐13	   0	  
3	   -­‐500	   -­‐1000	   13	   0	  
-­‐1500	  
-­‐1000	  
-­‐500	  
0	  
500	  
1000	  
1500	  
u : S12 (z1) > 0, S13 (z1) > 0 u
′ : S12 (z1) > 0, S13 (z1) < 0
Figure 3: Two preference profiles admitting an equilibrium with brokers with unanimity
rule, given uniform matching and δ = 0.95
Figure 6.2 illustrates two examples of preference profiles that admit a broker equilibrium,
when S12 (z1) > 0 and S13 (z1) > 0 (left) and S12 (z1) > 0 and S13 (z1) < 0 (right). The
figure highlights two interesting results. First, note that with unanimity the broker does
not have to prefer bailout to inaction, as it would in the majoritarian setting (Proposition
5.6). Moreover, the equilibrium with brokers is not necessarily welfare improving, as it
is in the majoritarian setting (Remark 5.5). The examples suggest that the decision rule
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has important effects on the properties of equilibrium outcomes. More work is needed to
fully assess the nature of these effects.
6.3 The President as a Broker
Up to this point, we have maintained the assumption that all actors in the model are
members of the legislature, and thus endowed with voting rights. However, nothing in
the model prevents the possibility that an outside party (say an interest group) plays the
role of the broker, if allowed to participate in backroom deals. In fact, given access, an
interest group is strategically equivalent to internal members, except that it cannot sell
votes in the initial round of decentralized bargaining. But since in equilibrium the broker
only sells votes after buying votes, our main analysis provides sufficient conditions for
the existence of an equilibrium with brokers where the interest group perform the role of
broker or ultimate buyer.
While this logic applies to any interest group, in the United States the role of outside bro-
ker is often played by the President, who can break an impasse between the majority and
minority parties in Congress. A well documented example is that of President Clinton’s
involvement in the passage of the NAFTA treaty, which the Bush administration had
negotiated with Canada and Mexico, and had the support of a majority of Republicans
in the House. According to President Clinton (Clinton (2004), pg. 546), “Al (Gore) and
I had called or seen two hundred members of Congress. . . We also had to make deals on a
wide array of issues; the lobbying effort for NAFTA looked even more like sausage making
than the budget fight had.”
The analysis of the President as a broker follows immediately as a special case if we as-
sume that the President does not have veto power. Since the President of the United
States does have veto power, however, our previous example does not squarely fall within
the majoritarian bargaining model. The analysis, however, can easily be adapted to in-
clude this institutional difference, building on our results for majoritarian and unanimous
legislatures.18
18The analysis of the legislature with a President holding veto power falls in between the cases of
the majoritarian and unanimous legislatures. The majority party 1 can form a winning coalition by
negotiating with either the President or the minority party (together they can override the President’s
veto). The minority party and the President, however, do not constitute a winning coalition. Because
of this, the equilibrium of bilateral bargaining between 1 and 2 is characterized by Proposition 4.1 if the
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7 Conclusion
Reaching agreements in collective bodies requires a variety of compromises and political
exchanges. The last fifty years have witnessed copious amounts of progress in explaining
four key types of these political transactions. The literature on logrolling focuses on bi-
lateral agreements among legislators, in which legislators exchange their support for a bill
in exchange for support for another bill. The literature on centralized bargaining focuses
on how potential competition among proposers shapes policy outcomes and distribution
of rents. The literature on vote buying studies how external lobbies, aware of the com-
petition of one another, design the pattern of offers to legislators in order to obtain the
support of a winning coalition. A fourth body of work studies decentralized buying and
selling of votes in a competitive market for votes.
The vast progress made notwithstanding, key questions remain. A crucial consideration
is that a large number of these political exchanges take the form of private negotiations
among legislators, which occur well before a bill is taken up for consideration. In fact,
legislative coalitions are often constructed through a series of backroom deals, carried out
by power brokers. Explaining the emergence and role of power brokers, and how legislators
reach extended political compromises, therefore requires (i) a model of decentralized (as
opposed to centralized) bargaining, (ii) where members of the committee (as opposed to
outsiders) can buy and sell votes, (iii) at prices that they negotiate with one another
(instead of taking prices as given) aware of further policy and rent repercussions, (iv) in a
setting that allows a gradual process of coalition formation (as opposed to final bilateral
agreements). In this paper, we propose such a model.
The main result of the paper shows that under a wide range of circumstances, successful
political deals occur because of the endogenous emergence of a power broker : a party
that serves as an intermediary between two parties that wouldn’t negotiate directly with
one another, transferring resources and voting rights among them in an indirect trade.
Furthermore, the broker can contribute to implement a different policy outcome from
that which would emerge in its absence, or in any other equilibrium keeping fixed the
composition of the legislature. We also show that in contrast with intermediaries in
minority party 3 sold its votes to 1 in decentralized bargaining, but by Remark 6.2 (from the analysis of
unanimity rule) if 3 sold its votes to the President (2). This difference in the end nodes transpires to the
rest of the path of play. Incentives for trading in nodes 1-3 and 1-2 are exactly as in the majoritarian
case, but 2-3 is governed by the logic under unanimity.
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exchange economies, political brokers must have a stake in the policy outcome.
The analysis of legislative brokers can be extended to decision rules other than simple
majority. We illustrated this by discussing briefly the case of unanimity and veto power.
The theoretical framework is also useful to understand other features of the process by
which legislators reach political compromises. Two issues that deserve more attention are
the conditions leading to gridlock, and a further characterization of the set of equilibrium
outcomes, both in general and in specialized settings (e.g., single-peaked preferences).
The three party model that we studied in this paper has the minimal structure required
to study the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining. However, some interesting
extensions would naturally require expanding the model to incorporate n > 3 legisla-
tors. This is the case, for example, of endogenous party formation in the legislature, or
more generally endogenous leadership in committees. With more than three players, the
particular definition of a broker equilibrium that we used in this paper would need to be
amended slightly to reflect the fact that more than one player could act as a broker (either
in competition with one another, or as part of a chain of trades). Thus we would not nec-
essarily require that any particular broker trades on the equilibrium path with probability
one, but that some broker does. We leave these extensions for future research.
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8 Appendix
Lemma 8.1 For any k, any i, j, and any number of players remaining,
W jji(k, buy) = W
i
ij(k, sell) +B
j(k)−Bi(k)
Proof of Lemma 8.1. First, note that W iij(k, sell) = B
i(k′)−tij(k), where k′ is the post
trade vote allocation. By sequential rationality, j accepts the offer iff Bj(k′) + tij(k) ≥
Bj(k). Then in equilibrium −tij(k) = Bj(k′)−Bj(k), and W iij(k, sell) = Bi(k′)+Bj(k′)−
Bj(k). Next, note that W jji(k, buy) = B
j(k′)− tji(k). By sequential rationality, i accepts
j’s offer iff Bi(k′) + tji(k) ≥ Bi(k). Then in equilibrium tji(k) = Bi(k) − Bi(k′), and
W jji(k, buy) = B
j(k′) +Bi(k′)−Bi(k). Subtracting yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Consider the problem of the majority party when it
has an opportunity to propose. M can, first of all, choose not to make a relevant offer
(wait), guaranteeing its post trade continuation value WMM (k, wait) = B
M(k). The post-
trade continuation values BM(k) and Bm(k) depend on whether M prefers to implement
its preferred policy or extend negotiations after UT: if u∗M ≥ δWM(k), M prefers to
implement zM and B
M(k) = u∗M , B
m(k) = um(zM), and if u
∗
M < δW
M(k), then M
prefers to extend negotiations after UT, so BM(k) = δWM(k) and Bm(k) = δWm(k).
But M can also exchange policy for rents by trading with m. If M makes a relevant
sell offer to m, the minority will then implement zm, so M gets a payoff W
M
M (k, sell) =
uM(zm)− tSM(k). For the minority party to accept the offer WmM (k, sell) = u∗m + tSM(k) ≥
Bm(k). Thus in equilibrium a relevant sell offer has a transfer −tSM(k) = u∗m − Bm(k),
and
WMM (k; sell) = S(zm)−Bm(k)
Similarly, if M makes a relevant buy offer, it obtains a payoff WMM (k, buy) = u
∗
M − tBM(k).
For the minority to accept this offer, WmM (k, buy) = um(zM) + t
B
M(k) ≥ Bm(k), so in
equilibrium tBM(k) = B
m(k)− um(zM), and
WMM (k, buy) = S(zM)−Bm(k)
We can now establish the majority party’s best response when it is its turn to propose,
given the equilibrium continuation values. Note that selling dominates buying if and only
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if mM (which we are assuming here by hypothesis), and implementing zM dominates
extending negotiations after UT if and only if u∗M ≥ δWM(k). Thus, if u∗M ≥ δWM(k),
M either implements zM or makes m a relevant sell offer. But here selling dominates
implementing zM because W
M
M (k; sell) = uM(zm) + u
∗
m − um(zM) ≥ u∗M ⇔ m  M .
When instead u∗M ≤ δWM(k), M either waits or makes m a relevant sell offer. Since
in this case the majority party extends negotiations in the event that m rejects an offer,
BM(k) = δWM(k) and Bm(k) = δWm(k), and M sells to m if and only if S(zm) ≥
δ
[
WM(k) +Wm(k)
]
. To summarize, when the majority party has the opportunity to
propose and m  M , M sells if either (i) u∗M ≥ δWM(k) or (ii) u∗M ≤ δWM(k) and
S(zm) ≥ δ
[
WM(k) +Wm(k)
]
, and otherwise waits and extends negotiations.
Establishing the best response of the minority party in the proposal node ((m,M),k) for
fixed continuation values is considerably easier because of Lemma 8.1. The minority party
m can buy, sell or wait. If it waits, it gets Wmm (k, wait) = B
m(k), and by Lemma 8.1,
Wmm (k, buy) = S(zm)−BM(k) and Wmm (k, sell) = S(zM)−BM(k). Thus, given mM ,
m either waits or makes M a relevant buy offer. If u∗M ≥ δWM(k), the majority party
implements zM after an unsuccessful trade, and buying dominates waiting for m, since
Wmm (k; buy) ≥ Wmm (k;wait) ⇔ m  M . If instead u∗M ≤ δWM(k), the minority party
prefers to trade if and only if S(zm) ≥ δ
[
WM(k) +Wm(k)
]
.
Proving the statements in the proposition now only requires to check the consistency of
these “short-run” best responses when values are determined endogenously.
1. Consider first part 1 of the Proposition. Suppose that in equilibrium (i) u∗M < δW
M(k)
and (ii) S(zm) ≥ δ[WM(k) + Wm(k)]. We have established that in this case m buys
from M in both trading nodes ((M,m),k) and ((m,M),k) and implements zm, while
the majority party extends negotiations after UT. Then WMM (k) = S(zm) − δWm(k),
Wmm (k) = S(zm)− δWM(k), WmM (k) = δWm(k) and WMm (k) = δWM(k). Thus
W j(k) = δW j(k) + ρj
{
S(zm)− δ[WM(k) +Wm(k)]
}
for j = m,M,
and therefore WM(k) = ρMS(zm) and W
m(k) = ρmS(zm). Substituting these values in
u∗M < δW
M(k) to check for consistency gives u∗M ≤ δρMS(zm). Substituting in S(zm) ≥
δ[WM(k) +Wm(k)] gives S(zm) ≥ 0, which is implied by u∗M ≤ δρMS(zm).
2. Consider next part 2. Suppose that in equilibrium u∗M ≥ δWM(k). Then m buys from
M in both trading nodes and implements zm, while the majority party implements its
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preferred policy after UT. Then W `` (k) = S(zm) − uj(zM) for ` = m,M , WMm (k) = u∗M ,
and WmM (k) = um(zM). Thus
W l(k) = ul(zM) + ρl(S(zm)− S(zM)) for l = m,M
Substituting back in u∗M ≥ δWM(k) for consistency gives (1−δ)u∗M ≥ δρM [S(zm)− S(zM)].
3. Finally, suppose that in equilibrium (i) u∗M < δW
M(k) and (ii) S(zm) < δ[W
M(k) +
Wm(k)]. Then M does not make a relevant offer in ((M,m),k) and m does not make a
relevant offer in ((m,M),k), after which M extends negotiations. As a result, agreement
is never reached, and therefore WM(k) = 0 and Wm(k) = 0. Substituting in (i), we get
u∗M < 0, which is impossible as long as zM 6= Q. This shows that (i) there does not exist
a MPE in which M and m do not trade in ((M,m),k) or ((m,M),k) and M extends
negotiations. It also shows that the equilibria in points 1 and 2 above are the only possible
pure strategy MPE of the majority-minority bargaining game with mM .
4. We now show that if (i) u∗M > δρMS(zm) and (ii) (1 − δ)u∗M < δρM [S(zm)− S(zM)],
there exists a MPE in which M sells to m when they meet and M implements z1 after UT
with probability α∗ ∈ (0, 1), and extends negotiations with probability 1−α∗, with α∗ as
defined in the Proposition. Suppose then that M sells to m in both trading nodes, and
after UT M implements zM with probability α, and extends negotiations with probability
(1− α). Consider ((M,m),k). From indifference after UT,
u∗M = δW
M(k) (9)
For M to prefer selling than implementing zM (or waiting),
WMM (k, sell) = uM(zm) + u
∗
m −Bm(k) ≥ u∗M (10)
Given the randomization after UT, BM(k) = u∗M , and
Bm(k) = αum(zM) + (1− α)δWm(k)
= um(zM)− (1− α)um(zM) + δ(1− α)Wm(k).
(11)
Then WmM (k) = B
m(k) (given above) and WMM (k) = W
M
M (k, sell) is
WMM (k) = uM(zm) + u
∗
m − αum(zM)− (1− α)δWm(k)
= u∗M + (S(zm)− S(zM))− δ(1− α)Wm(k) + (1− α)um(zM).
(12)
37
Next, consider ((m,M),k). In equilibrium, m will make M an offer that leaves her
indifferent. Then WMm (k) = B
M(k) = u∗M , and W
m
m (k) = W
m
m (k, buy) = S(zm)− u∗M . By
m  M , m prefers buying than selling. It prefers buying than waiting if Wmm (k, buy) =
S(zm) − u∗M ≥ Wmm (k, wait) = Bm(k), which is given by (11). Recalling that Wmm (k) =
S(zm)− u∗M and WmM (k) = Bm(k) then,
WmM (k) = um(zM) + (1− α) (δWm(k)− um(zM))
Wmm (k) = um(zM) + S(zm)− S(zM)
which imply that
Wm(k) = um(zM) +
ρm (S(zm)− S(zM))− (1− δ) (1− α)ρMum(zM)
1− δρM(1− α) (13)
From (12), (13), and given WMm (k) = u
∗
M , it follows that
WM (k) = u∗M +ρM (S(zm)− S(zM ))+(1−α) (1− δ) ρMum(zM )−(1−α)δρM (Wm(k)− um(zM )) (14)
and using Wm(k), and the fact that M has to be indifferent between implementing zM
and extending negotiations after UT, so that (9) must hold, we get
WM(k)− u∗M = ρM
1− δ(1− α) (S(zm)− S(zM))
1− δρM(1− α) +
(1− α) (1− δ) ρMum(zM)
1− δρM(1− α) (15)
Substituting WM(k) and simplifying
α∗ =
(1− δ)
δρM
(
u∗M − δρMS(zm)
δS(zm)− S(zM)
)
(16)
Note that u∗M ≥ δρMS(zm) and (1− δ)u∗M < δρM (S(zm)− S(zM)) together imply that
δS(zm) > S(zM), so α
∗ ≥ 0. On the other hand, note that α∗ < 1 iff (1− δ)u∗M <
δρM (S(zm)− S(zM)). It follows that α∗ ∈ [0, 1) when u∗M ≥ δρMS(zm) and (1− δ)u∗M <
δρM (S(zm)− S(zM)). Finally, note that from (9), evaluating (14) at α∗ gives δWM (k) =
u∗M . Adding (13) and (15) gives u
∗
m + uM(zm) = W
M(k) + Wm(k). Then from here
δWm(k) = δS(zm)− u∗M .
Lemma 8.2 Suppose that the initial vote endowment profile at the beginning of a trading
round is k, and let k′im denote the vote endowment profile after i buys from j in that round,
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and is left with minority party m. Then (0.a) W iij(k; buy) = B
i(k′im) +B
j(k′im)−Bj(k),
(0.b) W iij(k; sell) = B
i(k′jm) + B
j(k′jm) − Bj(k), and (0.c) W iij(k;wait) = Bi(k), and
thus:
1. W jji(k, buy) +B
i(k) = W iij(k, sell) +B
j(k).
2. W iij(k; sell) ≥ W iij(k; buy) if and only if Bi(k′jm) +Bj(k′jm) ≥ Bi(k′im) +Bj(k′im).
3. W iij(k; sell) ≥ W iij(k; buy) iff W jji(k; buy) ≥ W jji(k; sell).
4. W iij(k; sell) ≥ W iij(k;wait) iff W jji(k; buy) ≥ W jji(k;wait).
Proof of Lemma 8.2. To establish this result, note that W iij(k; buy) = B
i(k′im) −
tbuyij (k). For j to accept, B
j(k′im) + t
buy
ij (k) ≥ Bj(k). Then in equilibrium tbuyij (k) =
Bj(k) − Bj(k′im). Substituting, W iij(k; buy) = Bi(k′im) + Bj(k′im) − Bj(k). Similarly,
W iij(k; sell) = B
i(k′jm) − tsellij (k), and for j to accept, Bj(k′jm) + tsellij (k) ≥ Bj(k), so in
equilibrium tsellij (k) = B
j(k)−Bj(k′jm). Substituting, W iij(k; sell) = Bi(k′jm)+Bj(k′jm)−
Bj(k). This establishes part 0. Parts 1 and 2 follow immediately from 0. Part 3 follows
from 2, and part 4 follows from 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Consider first the state ((1, 2),k), for k such that k1 ≥ r,
k2 > 0, k3 > 0. Party 1 can extend negotiations (wait), make a relevant sell offer to 2, make
a relevant buy offer to 2, or implement z1. First note that party 1 can choose not to make
a relevant offer and implement z1, getting u
∗
1. Also W
1
12(k;wait) = B
1(k). Now consider
W 112(k; sell). With 2  3, in the next period (with endowment k′′), 2 would implement
z2 immediately with no trade. Anticipating this, 2 would implement z2 immediately after
buying 1’s votes. Then W 112(k; sell) = u1(z2) − t12(k). And for 2 to be willing to buy, it
must be that u∗2 + t12(k) ≥ B2(k). Thus in equilibrium −t12(k) = u∗2 −B2(k), and then
W 112(k; sell) = S12(z2)−B2(k)
The value for 1 of buying 2’s votes depends on whether 1 would trade with 3 in majority-
minority bargaining or not. From Lemma 8.2 for (M,m) = (1, 3), W 112(k; buy) = B
1(k′13)+
B2(k′13)−B2(k). The continuation values follow from Proposition 4.1 for (M,m) = (1, 3).
If 3 1 and u∗1 < δρ13S13(z3), the majority party 1 extends negotiations after trade with
2, and goes on to sell its votes to 3 in the next trading period. Then B1(k′13) = δW
1(k′13) =
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δρ13S13(z3), and B
2(k′13) = δW
2(k′13) = δu2(z3). If instead either 1  3, or 3  1 and
u∗1 ≥ δρ13S13(z3), party 1 implements z1 after trading with 2. Then B1(k′13) = u∗1,
B2(k′13) = u2(z1). Thus
W 112(k; buy) =
{
Π(21, 3)−B2(k) if 3 1 and u∗1 < δρ13S13(z3)
S12(z1)−B2(k) otherwise.
Next, consider the trading state ((1, 3),k). As in ((1, 2),k), party 1 can extend negotia-
tions (wait), make a relevant sell offer, make a relevant buy offer, or implement z1. As
before, W 113(k; gov) = u
∗
1 and W
1
13(k;wait) = B
1(k). Because 1 implements z1 after UT if
u∗1 ≥ δW 1(k), in this case B1(k) = u∗1 and B3(k) = u3(z1). If instead u∗1 ≤ δW 1(k), 1 ex-
tends negotiations after UT, so B1(k) = δW 1(k) and B3(k) = δW 3(k). Consider 1 selling
votes to 3. From Lemma 8.2, W 113(k; sell) = B
1(k′32)+B
3(k′32)−B3(k). The continuation
values are determined from Proposition 4.1 for (M,m) = (3, 2). If u∗3 < δρ32S23(z2), 3
extends negotiations after trade with 1, and goes on to sell votes to 2 in the next trading
period. Then B3(k′32) = δW
3(k′32) = δρ32S23(z2), B
1(k′32) = δW
1(k′32) = δu1(z2). If
instead u∗3 ≥ δρ32S23(z2), party 3 implements z3 immediately after trade with 1, so that
B3(k′32) = u
∗
3, and B
1(k′32) = u1(z3). Thus
W 113(k; sell) =
{
Π(13, 2)−B3(k) if 2 3 and u∗3 < δρ32S23(z2)
S13(z3)−B3(k) otherwise.
Finally, consider 1 buying votes from 3. Because 1 2 and 1 3, analyzing the case in
which 1 buys from 3 is equivalent to the case in which 1 buys from 2, changing the role
of 2 and 3. Therefore
W 113(k; buy) =
{
Π(31, 2)−B3(k) if 2 1 and u∗1 < δρ12S12(z2)
S13(z1)−B3(k) otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Consider first the state ((2, 3),k). Party 2 can extend
negotiations (wait), make a relevant sell offer, or make a relevant buy offer. As before,
W 223(k;wait) = B
2(k). Because 1 implements z1 after UT if u
∗
1 ≥ δW 1(k), in this case
Bi(k) = ui(z1) for i = 2, 3, and if instead u
∗
1 ≤ δW 1(k), 1 extends negotiations after UT,
so Bi(k) = δW i(k) for i = 2, 3.
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Consider 2 selling votes to 3. From Lemma 8.2, W 223(k; sell) = B
2(k′13)+B
3(k′13)−B3(k).
The continuation values are determined from Proposition 4.1 for (i, j) = (1, 3). If 3 
1 and u∗1 < δρ13S13(z3), 1 extends negotiations after 2 sells to 3, and goes on to sell
votes to 3 in the next trading period. Then B2(k′13) = δu2(z3), B
3(k′13) = δW
3(k′13) =
δρ31S13(z3), and W
2
23(k; sell) = Π˜(23, 1) − B3(k). If instead either 1  3, or 3  1 and
u∗1 ≥ δρ13S13(z3), party 1 implements z1 immediately after 2 sells to 3. Then B2(k′13) =
u2(z1), B
3(k′13) = u3(z1), and W
2
23(k; sell) = S23(z1)−B3(k).
Next consider 2 buying votes from 3. From Lemma 8.2, W 223(k; buy) = B
2(k′32)+B
3(k′32)−
B3(k). The relevant continuation values follow from Proposition 4.1 for (i, j) = (1, 2). If
2  1 and u∗1 < δρ12S12(z2), party 1 extends negotiations after 2 buys from 3, and goes
on to sell votes to 2 in the next trading period. Then B2(k′32) = δW
2(k′12) = δρ21S12(z2),
B3(k′32) = δu3(z2), and W
2
23(k; buy) = Π˜(32, 1)−B3(k). If instead either 1 2, or 2 1
and u∗1 ≥ δρ12S12(z2), party 1 implements z1 immediately after 2 buys from 3. Then
B2(k′32) = u2(z1), B
3(k′32) = u3(z1), and W
2
23(k; buy) = S23(z1)−B3(k).
The expressions for party 3’s payoffs in ((3, 1),k) as a function of the continuation values
now follow immediately using Lemma 8.2.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Consider W 2(k). Note that in all states ij other than 13 or 31,
W 2ij(k) = δW
2(k), and W 213(k) = W
2
31(k) = δW
2(k′32) = δρ23S23(z2). Then
W 2(k) =
δ(p13 + p31)ρ23S23(z2)
(1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31)
Now consider W 1(k). Note that in all states ij other than 13 (including 31) W 1ij(k) =
δW 1(k), and W 113(k) = Π(13, 2)− δW 3(k). Then
W 1(k) =
p13[Π(13, 2)− δW 3(k)]
1− δ(1− p13) (17)
Now consider W 3(k). Note that in all states ij other than 31 (including 13), W 3ij(k) =
δW 3(k), and W 331(k) = W
1
13(k) +B
3(k)−B1(k), so W 331(k) = Π(13, 2)− δW 1(k). Then
W 3(k) =
p31[Π(13, 2)− δW 1(k)]
1− δ(1− p31) (18)
Solving the system (17)-(18) gives
W 1(k) =
p13Π(13, 2)
(1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31) and W
3(k) =
p31Π(13, 2)
(1− δ) + δ(p13 + p31)
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Proof of Theorem 5.4, part 1. The equilibrium conditions (2)-(7) together with the
requirement that u ∈ U , and the dominance relations 1  2, 2  3, and 1  3 form
a system of linear inequalities in the unknowns ui(zj), which can be written as Au ≤ α,
where αT ≡ (09,−b9),
uT =
(
u∗1 u2(z1) u3(z1) u1(z2) u
∗
2 u3(z2) u1(z3) u2(z3) u
∗
3
)
,
and
A =

υ υ 0 −δ2p13 −δ2θ −δ2θ 0 0 0
0 υ υ −δ2p31 −δ2µ −δ2µ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −δρ32 −δρ32 0 0 1
1 0 1 −δ −δρ32 −δρ32 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 −ρ32 −ρ32 0 0 0
υ 0 0 −δ2p13 −δ2p13ρ32 −δ2p13ρ32 0 0 0
−1 −1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 −1 0 1 1
−1 0 −1 0 0 0 1 0 1
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1

(The rows in the matrix correspond to the inequalities in the text in the following order.
The first six rows are inequalities (6b), (7b), (3b), (4b), (5b), (2b). The next three rows
are the dominance order, and the last nine rows guarantee that for all i, j ∈ N , u∗i > ui(zj)
and u∗i > 0 = ui(Q).)
It follows from Lemma 5.3 that our original system of inequalities does not have a solution
if there exists a λ ≥ 0 such that:
υλ1 + λ4 + υλ6 − λ7 − λ9 − λ10 − λ11 − λ12 = 0
υλ1 + υλ2 − λ7 + λ14 = 0
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υλ2 + λ4 − λ9 + λ17 = 0 (19)
−δ2p13λ1 − δ2p31λ2 − δλ4 − λ5 − δ2p13λ6 + λ7 + λ11 = 0
−δ2θλ1 − δ2µλ2 − δρ32λ3 − δρ32λ4 − ρ32λ5 − δ2p13ρ32λ6 + λ7 − λ8 − λ13 − λ14 − λ15 = 0
−δ2θλ1 − δ2µλ2 − δρ32λ3 − δρ32λ4 − ρ32λ5 − δ2p13ρ32λ6 − λ8 + λ18 = 0 (20)
λ9 + λ12 = 0 (21)
λ8 + λ15 = 0 (22)
λ3 + λ8 + λ9 − λ16 − λ17 − λ18 = 0
and
18∑
i=10
λi > 0 (23)
From (21), λ9 = λ12 = 0, from (22), λ8 = λ15 = 0, and from (19) and λ9 = 0, λ2 =
λ4 = λ17 = 0. After substituting, we can further obtain λ3 = λ16 + λ18 ≥ 0, and
λ7 = υλ1 + λ14 ≥ 0. Substituting, the dual system becomes
υλ6 − λ14 − λ10 − λ11 = 0 (24)
[υ − δ2p13]λ1 − λ5 − δ2p13λ6 + λ14 + λ11 = 0
[υ − δ2θ]λ1 − δρ32λ16 − δρ32λ18 − ρ32λ5 − δ2p13ρ32λ6 − λ13 = 0
−δ2θλ1 − ρ32λ5 − δ2p13ρ32λ6 − δρ32λ16 + [1− δρ32]λ18 = 0 (25)
and
λ10 + λ11 + λ13 + λ14 + λ16 + λ18 > 0
From (24), υλ6 = λ10 + λ11 + λ14 ≥ 0, and from (25), [1 − δρ32]λ18 = δ2θλ1 + ρ32λ5 +
δ2p13ρ32λ6 + δρ32λ16 ≥ 0. Substituting, and simplifying, the dual system is
[υ − δ2p13]λ1 − λ5 − δ
2p13
υ
λ10 +
[
υ − δ2p13
υ
]
λ11 +
[
υ − δ2p13
υ
]
λ14 = 0 (26)
[
(1− δρ32)υ − δ2θ
]
λ1 = ρ32λ5 + (1− δρ32)λ13 + δρ32λ16 + δ
2p13ρ32
υ
(λ10 + λ11 + λ14) (27)
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and
δ2θλ1 + ρ32λ5 + δ
2p13ρ32λ6 + (1− δρ32)[λ10 + λ11 + λ13 + λ14] + λ16 > 0 (28)
Since all the coefficients on the RHS of (27) are positive, a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the solution of the dual system is that the coefficient of λ1 is positive as well,
i.e., (1 − δρ32)υ − δ2θ > 0. Therefore (1 − δρ32)υ − δ2θ ≤ 0 is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of a solution to the primal.
The proof of the second part of Theorem 5.4 uses the following Lemma.
Lemma 8.3 If (p, ρ, δ) ∈ P then there is an open subset U ⊂ U such that for every
u ∈ U , the legislative bargaining game with parameters (G, u) admits an equilibrium with
brokers for the matching probabilities (p, ρ, δ).
Proof of Lemma 8.3. Denote the dominance relation under preference profile u by
u. We say that i u j is stronger than i u′ j if u∗i + uj (zi) − (ui (zj) + u∗j) >
u∗′i + u
′
j (zi)− (u′i (zj) + u∗′j ). Fix some (p, ρ, δ) ∈ P . Theorem (5.4) implies that there is
some u(p,ρ,δ) ∈ U such that (2b) − (7b) and the dominance conditions hold at least with
equality. We now show that we can construct an open subset Uu(p,ρ,δ) ⊂ U around u(p,ρ,δ)
such that the legislative bargaining game ((p, ρ, δ) , u′) also admits a broker equilibrium
for every u′ ∈ Uu(p,ρ,δ) .
Take any pair (p, ρ, δ) ∈ P and any u(p,ρ,δ) ∈ U such that
(
(p, ρ, δ) , u(p,ρ,δ)
)
admits a
broker equilibrium. First note that reducing u1 (z3) by η˜1 > 0 makes the dominance
relation 1  3 stronger and does not affect any of the conditions in (2b) − (7b). Note
that by adding η3 > 0 to u3(z2) all conditions in (2b) − (7b) hold with strict inequality
and the dominance relation 2  3 becomes stronger. Moreover, since u(p,ρ,δ) ∈ U , then
u3(z2) < u
∗
3, and we can choose η3 sufficiently small in order to still remain in U . Note
now that reducing u1(z2) makes the dominance relation 1  2 stronger but makes all
conditions (2b)− (7b) but (3b), tighter. Let
∆η =
{
η = (η˜1, η1, η3) ∈ (0, η)3 : min
{
ρ32,
θ
p13
,
µ
p31
}
η3 > η1
}
for η > 0, and define for every η ∈ ∆η the vector
(∆uη)
T =
(
0 0 0 η1 0 η3 −η˜1 0 0
)
,
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Define u′η = u(p,ρ,δ) + ∆uη, and note that for sufficiently small η, u
′
η ∈ U . Let Uη,u(p,ρ,δ) ={
u′η ∈ R9 : u′η = u(p,ρ,δ) + ∆uη and η ∈ ∆η
}
. Note that since ∆η is open Uη,u is also open.
It is easy to see that for sufficiently small η > 0, if u′′ ∈ Uη,u(p,ρ,δ) then for (p, ρ, δ) the
preference profile u′′ verifies all conditions in (2b) − (7b), the dominance relations are
stronger under u′′ than under u(p,ρ,δ) and u′′ ∈ U . Therefore for every u′′ ∈ Uη,u(p,ρ,δ) the
legislative bargaining ((p, ρ, δ) , u′′) admits a broker equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5.4, part 2. By Lemma 8.3, for every (p, ρ, δ) ∈ intP there is
an open subset U(p,ρ,δ) ⊂ U such that for every u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ), the legislative bargaining
game with parameters ((p, ρ, δ) , u) admits a broker equilibrium. We need to show that
if u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ) there is an open ball around (p, ρ, δ) such that u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ) still admits a
broker equilibrium for every element in that open ball around (p, ρ, δ). We will do this in
a way that does not depend on the particular u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ) that we chose, thus establishing
the result for all element of U(p,ρ,δ). Let (p, ρ, δ) ∈ intP , and construct (p′, ρ′, δ′) in
the following way: add η13 > 0 to p13, −η13 to p31, η23 > 0 to ρ23 and ηδ > 0 to δ.
Since (p, ρ, δ) ∈ intP , it follows that (p′, ρ′, δ′) ∈ intP for sufficiently small (η13, η23, ηδ).
Since every u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ) verifies (2b) − (7b) with strict inequality for (p, ρ, δ), we must
have that for sufficiently small (η13, η23, ηδ), u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ) verifies (2b) − (7b) with strict
inequality for (p′, ρ′, δ′). Let η ∈ [0, ξ]3 for ξ > 0, and, with some abuse of notation, let
(p′, ρ′, δ′)η ≡ (p, ρ, δ) + η. Note that for every u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ) there is some ηu = (η13, η23, ηδ)
such that if η < ηu, u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ) admits a broker equilibrium for (p′, ρ′, δ′)η and conditions
(2b)− (7b) hold with strict inequality. Define η ≡ min
u∈U(p,ρ,δ)
ηu, and note that since ηu > 0
for all u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ), then η > 0. Next define
P(p,ρ,δ) =
{
(p′, ρ′, δ′)η ∈ intP : η < η
}
,
and note that by definition of η we have that every u ∈ U(p,ρ,δ) admits a broker equilibrium
for every (p′, ρ′, δ′) ∈ P(p,ρ,δ).
Proof of Theorem 5.4, part 3. We need to show that whenever there exists a
BE, there is no other equilibrium implementing z2, and no equilibrium implementing z3.
Consider z2 first. If party 2 doesn’t acquire the majority from 3, it must acquire the
majority directly from party 1. We will show that this is not possible. First, note that
because 1  2, there is no equilibrium in which 2 acquires the majority from 1 in the
majority minority bargaining game and implements z2. Thus, this could only happen in
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decentralized bargaining (when k3 > 0).
So suppose this is the case. There are two possible continuations. First, suppose that 2
implements z2 immediately after buying 1 out. Note that this cannot be an equilibrium,
for in this case equilibrium payoffs for 1 and 2 are the same as if 3 were not present, and
then 1  2 again rules out 1 selling to 2. It must be then that 2 extends negotiations
after buying 1 out in order to negotiate with 3 in bilateral bargaining, and is then able to
both implement z2 and obtain a transfer from 3 (allowing him to make 1 a higher offer in
the first place).19
Let k′ij denote the state in majority-bargaining between i and j where i has the majority
of the votes. Since 2  3, we know that 2 prefers to make a buy offer instead of a sell
offer, in which case the transfer is determined by u3 (z2) + t23 (k
′
23) = δW
3 (k′23) yielding
the continuation values W 223 (k
′
23) = S23(z2) − δW 3 (k′23) and W 323 (k′23) = δW 3 (k′23).
On the other hand, 3 will make a sell offer when it is her turn to propose (see Lemma
8.2) which implies that the transfer is determined by u∗2 + t32 (k
′
23) = δW
2 (k′23). Thus
W 232 (k
′
23) = δW
2 (k′23) and W
3
32 (k
′
23) = S23(z2)− δW 2 (k′23), and therefore
W 2 (k′23) = ρ23S23(z2) and W
3 (k′23) = (1− ρ23)S23(z2)
For this to be an equilibrium, we need to verify u∗2 ≤ δW 2 (k′23) = ρ23S23(z2), so that 2
wants to extend negotiations after buying from 1 in decentralized trading. Equivalently,
we need u∗2 ≤ δρ231−δρ23u3 (z2). Using this result in (3b) we have
u∗3 ≤
δρ32
1− δρ23u3 (z2) ⇒ u
∗
3 − u3 (z2) ≤
δ − 1
1− δρ23u3 (z2) ≤ 0 ⇒ u /∈ U
Next consider z3. In order for z3 to be implemented it must be that 3 acquires the majority.
There are four ways in which this can happen: 1) the majority-minority bargaining stage
is reached by 1 and 3 (it does not matter who bought 2’s votes), 2) the majority-minority
bargaining stage is reached by 2 and 3 and 2 has the majority of the votes, 3) the majority-
minority bargaining stage is reached by 2 and 3 and 3 has the majority of the votes, and
4) the majority-minority bargaining stage is not reached and 3 buys the votes from 1
in decentralized bargaining. In the first case, since 1  3, we have that z3 cannot be
19As discussed in footnote 4, this outcome cannot be directly ruled out in bilateral bargaining because
a majority party 2 can under some conditions charge 3 to implement z2 by threatening her to keep the
status quo after UT.
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implemented because 3 does not have enough resources to pay 1. The same is true in
case 2 but now with 2 instead of 1. Note that in order to reach the majority-minority
bargaining stage it must be that 3 prefers to move onto that stage after buying all the
votes from 1. Therefore it must be that u∗3 ≤ δW 3 (k′32). Note that if there is some other
equilibria it must be that 3 is charging 2 to implement z3. Therefore the “buy” offer from
3 is such that u2 (z3) + t32 (k
′
32) = δW
2 (k′32), which implies that the payoffs are given by
W 332 (k32) = u
∗
3 + u2 (z3)− δW 2 (k′32) and W 232 (k′32) = δW 2 (k′32)
Note that this implies that W 332 (k
′
32) + W
2
32 (k
′
32) = S23(z3) < S23(z2) so there is another
offer that 3 can make that will leave him better off. In fact 3 is better off by making a
sell offer as presented in Proposition 4.1. Finally let’s focus in the case where 3 bought
the votes from 1 and implements z3 after decentralized bargaining. It is easy to see that
in decentralized bargaining stage 3 does not have enough resources to pay 1 since 1 3
so z3 cannot be implemented in this way either.
Proof of Remark 5.5. First note that (2b) implies that
υu∗1 − δ2p13ρ23u1(z2) ≤ δ2p13ρ32 (u1(z2) + u∗2 + u3(z2))
0 <
(
υ − δ2p13ρ23
)
u∗1 ≤ δ2p13ρ32 (u1(z2) + u∗2 + u3(z2))
Now adding (2b) and (7b) we obtain
υ (u∗1 + u2(z1) + u3(z1)) ≤ δ2 (p31 + p13) (u1(z2) + u∗2 + u3(z2))
and since 0 < u1(z2) + u
∗
2 + u3(z2) it follows that
u∗1 + u2(z1) + u3(z1) <
δ (p31 + p13)
υ
(u1(z2) + u
∗
2 + u3(z2)) =
∑
i
W i (k)
Proof of Remark 5.7. Let k′32 = k + (−k1, 0,+k1) denote the vote allocation after
1 sold the votes to 3. Recall that on the equilibrium path, there are only two potential
transfers in the decentralized bargaining stage: t13(k) and t31(k), characterized by tji(k) =
Bi(k) − Bi(k′32). Since in equilibrium 1 extends negotiations after UT, then Bi(k) =
δW i (k) while B1(k′32) = δu1 (z2) and B
3(k′32) = δρ32S32 (z2). Therefore, we have that
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t31(k) = δW
1 (k) − δu1 (z2) and t13(k) = δW 3(k) − δρ32S32 (z2). Using Lemma (5.1) for
W 1(k) and W 3(k), then
t31(k) =
δp13
υ
Π(13, 2)− δu1 (z2) and t13(k) = δp31
υ
Π(13, 2)− δρ32S32 (z2) ,
In the majority-minority bargaining stage, on the other hand, we have t32(k
′
32) = ρ23S32 (z2)−
u∗2 and t23(k
′
32) = ρ32S32 (z2) − u3 (z2), and thus the expected transfer from 2 to 3 in
majority-minority bargaining is given by
ET23 (k
′) = ρ23t23(k′32)− ρ32t32(k′32) = ρ32S23(z2)− u3 (z2)
In order to calculate the expected transfer to 3 we use a recursive representation given by
ET (k) = (1− p13 − p31) δET (k) + p13 (t13 (k′32) + δET23 (k′32)) + p31 (−t31 (k′32) + δET23 (k′32))
=
ET13 (k) + δ (p13 + p31)ET23 (k
′
32)
υ
=
δ
υ
[(p31 + p13)S(z2)− (p13u1 (z2) + θS23 (z2))]
Using that (6b) implies υ
δ2
S12(z1) ≤ p13u1(z2) + θS23(z2) we have that
ET (k) ≤ δ (p31 + p13)S12 (z2)−
υ
δ2
S12(z1)
υ
≤ δ (p31 + p13)−
υ
δ2
υ
S12(z1) < 0
where the second line follows from S12(z1) ≥ S12 (z2).
Proof of Proposition 5.10. Part 1. By Lemma 8.2, it is enough to analyze party
1’s decisions in node ((1, 3),k). First note that since u∗3 ≤ δρ32S23(z2), party 3 extends
negotiations after buying from 1. Then from Lemma 4.2, we haveW 113(k; sell) = Π(13, 2)−
B3(k). Moreover, by hypothesis, u∗1 ≤ δW 1(k), so that party 1 extends negotiations after
UT with three parties. Then B3(k) = δW 3(k) and W 113(k; sell) = Π(13, 2) − δW 3(k).
Party 1’s payoff for buying votes from 3 depends on whether party 1 would implement z1
immediately or extend negotiations after buying from 3 (off the equilibrium path). If 1
implements z1 after buying from 3 (either 1  2, or 2  1 and u∗1 > δρ12S12(z2)), then
from Lemma 4.2, W 113(k; buy) = S13(z1) − δW 3(k). Then 1 prefers selling to buying iff
S13(z1) ≤ Π(13, 2), and prefers selling to extending negotiations iff δ[W 1(k) + W 3(k)] ≤
Π(13, 2). If instead party 1 extends negotiations after buying from 3 (2  1 and u∗1 ≤
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δρ12S12(z2)), then from Lemma 4.2, W
1
13(k; buy) = Π(31, 2) − δW 3(k). Then 1 prefers
selling to buying iff Π(31, 2) ≤ Π(13, 2), and selling to extending negotiations iff δ[W 1(k)+
W 3(k)] ≤ Π(13, 2). This proves part (1) of the Proposition.
Part 2. By Lemma 8.2, it is enough to analyze party 1’s decisions in node ((1, 2),k). By
hypothesis u∗1 ≤ δW 1(k), and therefore in any equilibrium party 1 extends negotiations
after UT in decentralized trading. Since 2 3 (wlog), if 2 were to buy from 1, it would
immediately implement z2. We have two cases, depending on whether 1 would choose to
(i.a) extend negotiations or (ii.b) implement its preferred policy after buying from 2.
(a) Suppose party 1 extends negotiations after buying from 2, and goes on to sell votes
to 3 in the next trading period (3  1 and u∗1 < δρ13S13(z3)). Then W 112(k, gov) =
u∗1 < W
1
12(k, wait) = δW
1
12(k), W
1
12(k, sell) = u1(z2) + u
∗
2 − δW 2(k), and W 112(k, buy) =
Π(21, 3)− δW 2(k). Thus 1 prefers selling than buying iff
S12(z2) ≥ Π(21, 3), (29)
prefers selling to extending negotiations if
S12(z2) ≥ δ[W 1(k) +W 2(k)], (30)
and prefers buying than extending negotiations if
Π(21, 3) ≥ δ[W 1(k) +W 2(k)]. (31)
It follows that if (29) and (30), 1 sells to 2, who then implements z2. And if (31) and
not(29), 1 buys votes from 2, and goes on to sell votes to 3 in the next trading period.
If, however, either (29) and not(30), or not(29) and not(31), 1 does not make a relevant
offer and extends negotiations.
(b) Suppose party 1 implements its preferred policy immediately after buying from 2
(either 1 3, or 3 1 and u∗1 > δρ13S13(z3)). From (i) W 112(k; buy) = S12(z1)− δW 2(k).
Moreover, from (ii), B1(k) = δW 1(k) and B2(k) = δW 2(k), and therefore W 112(k; sell) =
S12(z2)−δW 2(k). Then 1 prefers selling than buying iff 2 1, prefers selling to extending
negotiations if (30), and buying to extending negotiations if
S12(z1) ≥ δ[W 1(k) +W 2(k)]. (32)
It follows that if 2 1 and (30), 1 sells to 2 in ((1, 2),k), who then implements z2. And
if 1 2 and (32), 2 pays 1 in ((1, 2),k) to implement z1 immediately. If, however, either
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2  1 and not(30), or 1  2 and not(32), 1 doesn’t make a relevant offer in ((1, 2),k)
and extends negotiations. This concludes the proof of part (2) of the Proposition.
Part 3. By Lemma 8.2, it is enough to analyze party 2’s decisions in node ((2, 3),k).
We organize the analysis in four cases, depending on whether party 1 (i.a) implements
z1 or (i.b) extends negotiations after 2 buys from 3 (off the equilibrium path), and on
whether party 1 (ii.a) implements z1 or (ii.b) extends negotiations after 3 buys from 2
(off the equilibrium path). In all cases we require that 1 extends negotiations after UT in
decentralized trading; i.e., u∗1 ≤ δW 1(k).
(a) Suppose (i) party 1 implements z1 immediately after 2 sells to 3 (either 1  3,
or 3  1 and u∗1 > δρ13S13(z3)), and (ii) party 1 implements z1 immediately after 2
buys from 3 (either 1  2, or 2  1 and u∗1 > δρ12S12(z2)). Then from Lemma 4.3,
W 223(k; sell) = S23(z1)−δW 3(k) and W 223(k; buy) = S23(z1)−δW 3(k). Thus 2 is indifferent
between selling or buying, and prefers not to make a relevant offer in ((2, 3),k) than to
sell if and only if (7), or S23(z1) ≤ δ[W 2(k) +W 3(k)].
(b) Suppose (i) party 1 implements z1 immediately after 2 sells to 3 (either 1  3, or
3  1 and u∗1 > δρ13S13(z3)), and (ii) party 1 extends negotiations after 2 buys from 3
(2  1 and u∗1 ≤ δρ12S12(z2)). Then from Lemma 4.3, W 223(k; sell) = S23(z1) − δW 3(k)
and W 223(k; buy) = Π˜(32, 1)−δW 3(k). Then 2 prefers waiting to selling iff (7), and prefers
waiting to buying iff
Π˜(32, 1) ≤ δ[W 2(k) +W 3(k)]. (33)
(c) Suppose (i) party 1 extends negotiations after 2 sells to 3, and goes on to sell votes to
3 in the next trading period (3  1 and u∗1 ≤ δρ13S13(z3)), and (ii) party 1 implements
z1 immediately after 2 buys from 3 (either 1 2, or 2 1 and u∗1 > δρ12S12(z2)). Then
from Lemma 4.3, W 223(k; sell) = Π˜(23, 1)− δW 3(k) and W 223(k; buy) = S23(z1)− δW 3(k).
Then 2 prefers to wait than to buy iff (7), and to wait than to sell iff
Π˜(23, 1) ≤ δ[W 2(k) +W 3(k)]. (34)
(d) Suppose (i) party 1 extends negotiations after 2 sells to 3, and goes on to sell votes
to 3 in the next trading period (3  1 and u∗1 ≤ δρ13S13(z3)), and (ii) party 1 extends
negotiations after 2 buys from 3 (2  1 and u∗1 ≤ δρ12S12(z2)). Then from Lemma 4.3,
W 223(k; sell) = Π˜(23, 1)− δW 3(k) and W 223(k; buy) = Π˜(32, 1)− δW 3(k)]. Then 2 prefers
waiting to selling iff (34), and prefers waiting to buying iff (33).
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